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Abstract 
 
The financial crisis that began in the summer of 2007 changed many aspects of the 
financial world. On the one hand, governing regulatory bodies around the globe 
introduced rules and regulations, with the goal of preventing another financial crisis of 
similar dimensions. On the other hand, investors changed their investment style. 
Structured products, viewed as one of the causes of the recent financial crisis, suffered 
severely. At the same time the demand for sustainable and climate related products rises 
massively. This thesis analyses the pricing of a variety of instruments (Bonds, Stocks, CDS, 
ABS and CLOs) in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis. Special attention is drawn 
upon the impact of changes in investor attitudes and regulatory changes on the pricing of 
the analyzed financial instruments. 
 
 
Kurzbeschreibung 
Die globale Finanzkrise, die im Sommer 2007 begann, veränderte viele Aspekte der 
internationalen Finanzmärkte. Einerseits wurden regulatorische Rahmenbedingungen 
geschafften, um zukünftige Krisen dieser Dimension zu verhindern. Anderseits veränderte 
sich das Investmentverhalten der Investoren. Das Volumen strukturierter Produkte, die 
als ein Auslöser der Krise angesehen wurden, ging massiv zurück. Gleichzeitig wächst die 
Nachfrage nach nachhaltigen Investments und Finanzanlagen, die Klimaschutzprojekte 
finanzieren. Diese Dissertation untersucht verschiedene Finanzinstrumente (Anleihen, 
Aktien, CDS, ABS und CLOs) seit der Finanzkrise. Dabei wird spezieller Fokus auf die 
Auswirkungen von regulatorischen Änderungen sowie Änderungen im 
Investmentverhalten der Investoren auf die Preisbildung der untersuchten 
Finanzinstrumente gelegt. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
The financial crisis that began in the summer of 2007 changed many aspects of the 
financial world. Governing regulatory bodies around the globe introduced rules and 
regulations, with the goal of preventing another financial crisis of similar dimensions (see 
e.g. Hanson et al. 2011; Acharya et al. 2011). 
At the same time investors changed their investment style. Structured products, viewed 
as one of the causes of the recent financial crisis (see e.g. Demyanyk and van Hemert 
2008; Bank for International Settlements 2008), suffered severely in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis. In Europe in particular, securitizations remain subdued. The European 
Commission, among others, made efforts to revive the securitization market (European 
Commission 2015), but at the same time regulations introduced since the financial crisis 
created burdens for investors which lead to extra costs, or lead to investors refraining 
from buying securitizations (Bryan and Ingram 2015; Guo and Wu 2014). Contrary to 
this, climate related products such as green bonds experience exponential growth. 
Investors actively engage in environmental, social and governance (ESG) related issues 
and influence corporate behavior. Financial firms with combined assets over 80 trillion 
U.S. dollars, including 20 out of 30 Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs), eight 
out of ten of the largest asset managers and many leading insurance companies and 
pension funds, have committed to support the Task Force on Climate-related Financial 
Disclosure (TCFD 2017). Climate change is seen as a clear danger to financial stability 
(see e.g. Carney 2018). 
The U.S. recently started to loosen regulations, only introduced a few years ago, again. 
Shortly after his election as president of the U.S., Donald Trump fulfilled his promise of a 
repeal of parts of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(Dodd–Frank Act 2010). The Dodd-Frank Act had been introduced in 2010. Among 
others, it regulates derivative products, limits the banks’ proprietary trading activities and 
created new regulatory authorities. The U.S. risk retention rules for securitizations are 
also part of the Dodd-Frank Act (Section 941) and, in contrast to the European risk 
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retention rules, are in the process of being dismantled for collateralized loan obligations 
(CLOs). 
Within this thesis, two main questions are answered. The first question is: is security 
pricing in the aftermath of the global financial crisis affected by a change in investor 
attitudes? On the one hand, since the financial crisis a number of investors, especially in 
Europe, have been reluctant to invest in structured products and moved towards more 
“plain vanilla” products. On the other hand, ESG related products gain more and more 
importance for investors. So is a change in investor sentiment leading to a change in asset 
pricing? Are investors even willing to accept less return for ESG products, in this case 
green bonds, compared to conventional investments? 
The second question is: how do (anticipated) regulatory changes affect financial markets 
and the pricing of financial products? Since the financial crisis, a number of regulations 
have been introduced worldwide. One regulation will be analyzed in detail, the risk 
retention rule for securitizations, introduced in Europe in 2011. Another field of study are 
the effects of the anticipation of changes in regulation on financial products. Implications 
of the anticipated repeal of regulations could be seen in the reaction of financial 
instruments on banks around the world. 
To analyze changes in asset pricing, primary and secondary markets of the respective 
financial products are studied empirically. For liquid instruments like bonds, stocks and 
credit default swaps (CDS), secondary market prices (or spreads) are examined. For less 
liquid markets like asset-backed securities (ABS) and CLOs (see. e.g. Fabozzi and Vink 
2012), primary market spreads are drawn upon. 
1.2 Structure of a securitization and credit ratings 
Financial products in form of securitizations and their changes in pricing are the focus of 
chapter four and five of the thesis. Therefore it is essential to understand the basic 
structure of a securitization. With the help of a securitization, assets are pooled, tranched 
and their future cash flows are sold to investors (see e.g. Fabozzi and Kothari 2008; 
McPherson 2000; Buchanan 2014). Different tranches with diverse credit ratings help to 
meet investors’ demand and risk appetite. Figure 1.1 shows the basic structure of a 
securitization. The underlying pooled assets, also called collateral of the transaction, are 
either originated (as in chapter four, auto ABS) or bought in the primary or secondary 
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market and managed (as in chapter five, CLOs). The securitizations are issued by special 
purpose vehicles (SPVs) or Master Trusts and are structured in various tranches 
depending on their default risk. The least risky tranche is a senior tranche, followed by 
mezzanine and equity tranche. 
Figure 1.1: Securitization structure 
 
 
 
 
 
The various tranches issued by the SPV or Master Trust provide the investors with 
different risk and return profiles. The most senior tranche of a securitization is typically 
rated AAA, bears the lowest risk and has the lowest nominal return. The mezzanine 
tranches (which can be numerous) have higher risk profiles and higher coupons. The 100 
largest auto ABS issued since the financial crisis (analyzed in chapter four) consist on 
average of 2.5 tranches in Europe and 5.2 tranches in the U.S. European CLOs issued 
since the financial crisis (subject of chapter five) have on average 7 tranches. The most 
junior tranche of a securitization, the equity tranche, bears the highest risk. As it usually 
does not receive a predefined coupon, is not rated and does not receive a predefined 
principal repayment at the end, it is similar to shares issued by corporations (see e.g. 
Pistre et al. 2017; Choudhry 2010). Therefore, interests of debt and equity investors in a 
transaction may diverge, which will be looked at closer in chapter five. A hedging 
counterparty may be necessary to align cash flows of the underlying assets with cash flows 
the investors receive (e.g. interest hedges, currency hedges etc.). 
To indicate expected default risk for investors in fixed income securities, and for pricing 
considerations of financial instruments, credit ratings are of high importance (Bank for 
International Settlements 2005; Fabozzi and Vink 2012). In fact, an overreliance on credit 
ratings was seen as one of the causes leading to the recent financial crisis (see e.g. Bank 
for International Settlements 2008; He et al. 2011). Throughout the thesis, credit ratings 
from one or more of the three largest rating agencies Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 
and Fitch Ratings are used (see models chapter two, chapter four and chapter five). Table 
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1.1 provides an overview of the ratings provided by the three rating agencies (compare 
e.g. Fabozzi and Mann 2012). 
Table 1.1: Credit rating classes 
Moody's S&P Fitch 
Numeric 
Rating Rating description 
Aaa AAA AAA 17 Prime 
Aa1 AA+ AA+ 16  
Aa2 AA AA 15 High grade 
Aa3 AA- AA- 14   
A1 A+ A+ 13  
A2 A A 12 Upper medium grade 
A3 A- A- 11   
Baa1 BBB+ BBB+ 10  
Baa2 BBB BBB  9 Lower medium grade 
Baa3 BBB- BBB- 8   
Ba1 BB+ BB+ 7  
Ba2 BB BB 6 Non-investment grade 
Ba3 BB- BB- 5   
B1 B+ B+ 4  
B2 B B 3 Highly speculative 
B3 B- B- 2   
Caa1 CCC+ CCC+ 1 Substantial risk 
 
Credit ratings of the three rating agencies provided for the same security may differ, as 
they use slightly varying methodologies to compile their ratings. For the creation of the 
models of the thesis either the credit rating as a dummy variable, or the recalculated 
numeric rating (see Table 1.1) is applied. Recalculated numeric ratings are used in 
previous literature (Norden and Weber 2004; Friewald et al. 2012; Kiesel and Schiereck 
2015). The highest rating available is either Aaa (Moody’s) or AAA (S&P and Fitch) and 
corresponds to a numeric rating of 17, ratings Caa1 (Moody’s), CCC+ (S&P and Fitch), 
or lower (not outlined in Table 1.1) correspond to a value of 1. 
1.3 Thesis structure 
The main body of the thesis is split into four stand-alone papers. Each paper can be read 
individually and consists of an introduction, a literature review, a description about data 
and methodologies used, a section that deals with the results of the models, and the 
conclusion that has been drawn for the respective research question(s). The various 
papers examine different financial products. Subject of the analysis are bonds (chapter 
two), stocks and CDS (chapter three), ABS (chapter four) and CLOs (chapter five). The 
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combining elements for all papers are regulatory changes, which means regulatory 
changes that have been introduced from the governing bodies in Europe and the U.S. 
since the recent financial crisis, as well as changes in investor attitudes since the financial 
crisis. It is examined if those changes led as a consequence to changes in the underlying 
market of the respective products, in particular to changes in the pricing of these financial 
instruments. 
Figure 1.2 illustrates the structure of the thesis. The left hand side of the figure shows the 
products analyzed per chapter. The right hand side of the figure presents the elements 
that may have caused a change in pricing. In the middle of the figure the six chapters are 
outlined. 
Figure 1.2: Overview of the main structure of the thesis 
 
 
Chapter two deals with green bonds, a lately developed financial product that mainly 
gathered importance after the recent financial crisis. The proceeds of green bonds are 
used to support climate related or environmental projects. Climate change is a global issue 
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6 
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that has become more and more important for investors. Green bonds are issued 
worldwide and although regional differences exist, voluntary guidelines, the Green Bond 
Principles, connect green bonds globally. Investor demand for green bonds is high and 
exceeds supply by far. Issuing green bonds implies for the issuer extra costs compared to 
conventional bonds (e.g. a second opinion, separate accounting, reporting throughout the 
life of the transaction) thus the question arises if “issuing green” justifies the extra costs. 
Therefore, the research question, whether green bonds are priced differently from 
conventional bonds, is addressed. Three hypotheses are drawn. The first hypothesis is 
that green bonds trade tighter than non-green bonds. The second hypothesis is that 
pricing differences are larger for lower ratings. The third hypothesis is that pricing 
differences vary across industries. To find support for the hypotheses, panel regressions 
are utilized and secondary spreads (interpolated spreads, i.e. i-spreads above the 
respective benchmark of the bonds) are used. To match green and non-green bonds as 
closely as possible, each green bond is compared to two non-green bonds of the same 
issuer, with a similar maturity, the same currency, same coupon (fixed or floating) and 
no bond has embedded options or other structural features. The conclusion is drawn that 
indeed green bonds price economically marginally tighter than conventional bonds, which 
confirms that investors’ demand for climate related, environmental products is high. 
So far green bonds are not regulated differently from conventional bonds. Voluntary 
guidelines in the form of Green Bond Principles exist, but the issuer is not obliged to 
accept them if he calls his bonds “green”. Many parties, especially investors, call for 
regulation of green products as they believe a standardization would help transparency 
within this new market. 
Chapter three deals with anticipated market reforms triggered by a surprising market 
event. Donald Trump’s election as president in November 2016 came as a surprise to the 
majority of capital market participants. The election triggered the expectation of a repeal 
of regulatory reforms, namely the Dodd-Frank Act. The Dodd-Frank Act had only been 
established a few years earlier, in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis. In chapter 
three, very liquid financial instruments, bank stocks and the 5 year CDS spread of banks 
are the chosen products to measure global reactions to a local event. The anticipated 
repeal or reshaping of the Dodd-Frank Act was expressed in a significant reaction of banks’ 
stocks and CDS. The reaction of the respective secondary stock prices and CDS spreads is 
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measured using a system of regressions with a seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) 
framework (Zellner 1962). 
In chapters four and five less liquid financial instruments, namely auto ABS and CLOs, 
are analyzed. Thus in this case no secondary prices or spreads are used to analyze changes 
in asset pricing, but spreads at issuance of the papers instead. In chapter four the 
European market is compared to the U.S. market. In chapter five just the European 
market, and in particular a regulation that has been introduced in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis, the so called risk retention rule, is analyzed. Two main questions are 
looked at. In chapter four the hypothesis is drawn that the auto ABS market has recovered 
fully since the financial crisis. Three ordinary least square regression (OLS) models are 
created and the U.S., as well as the European auto ABS market, is analyzed. For the U.S. 
market it can be concluded that the market fully recovered. For the European market 
though, the hypothesis cannot be confirmed but it is discovered that the market has only 
partially recovered. The European auto ABS market is still to a large extent dependent on 
support by the ECB, since numerous tranches are retained by issuers and not sold to 
investors. Those tranches are usually used for ECB collateral instead. 
In chapter five, the question as to how the introduction of the risk retention rule (a 
regulation introduced in Europe in 2011) has impacted the European CLO market is 
answered. The focus is again the pricing of the securities, in this case CLOs, since the 
financial crisis. Three different areas are analyzed. The issuance volume of CLOs and the 
impact on CLO managers are looked at, and the question whether investors differentiate 
between a vertical and horizontal risk retention when investing in CLOs, is answered. The 
finding is that during the time of the introduction of the risk retention rule the CLO market 
suffered significantly. 
The last chapter, chapter six, draws the final conclusion of the four papers and the thesis. 
Main findings are summarized and the impact of changes in regulation and investor 
attitudes on asset pricing is presented. 
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2 Are green bonds priced differently from conventional 
bonds?1 
 
Abstract 
The young growing market for green bonds offers investors the opportunity to take an 
explicit focus on climate protecting investment projects. However, it is an open question 
whether this new asset class is also offering attractive risk-return-profiles compared to 
conventional (non-green) bonds. To address this question, we match daily i-spreads of 
green labelled and similar non-green labelled bonds and look at their pricing differentials. 
We find that rating classes AA-BBB of green bonds as well as the full sample trade 
marginally tighter for the respective period compared to non-green bonds of the same 
issuers. Furthermore, financial and corporate green bonds trade tighter than their 
comparable non-green bonds, government related bonds on the other hand trade 
marginally wider. Issue size, maturity and currency do not have a significant influence on 
differences in pricing but industry and ESG rating. 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Sustainable and responsible investments (SRI) are estimated to have reached 22.89 
trillion U.S. dollars globally in 2016 (Global Sustainable Investment Alliance 2017). In 
Canada and Europe,2 which represent two of the three largest markets, bonds account for 
64.4% of SRI. Further indicators show that this large market will grow on an accelerating 
pace within the next years. 409 investors representing more than 24 trillion U.S. dollars 
in assets signed a statement that emphasizes the need for climate resilient investments.3 
Likewise more than 1,500 investors representing around 60 trillion U.S. dollars in assets 
under management have signed the principles for responsible investment (Principles for 
Responsible Investment 2016). While the SRI market is globally expanding academic 
research is following. More than 2,000 studies have been published since the 1970s about 
                                                 
1 This chapter is based on a working paper, Schiereck D., Hachenberg B. (2018): Are green bonds priced 
differently from conventional bonds? 
2 Other regions apart from Canada and Europe did not collect data on asset allocation. Canada and Europe 
together represent more than 57% of sustainable assets (Global Sustainable Investment Alliance 2017). 
3 http://www.iigcc.org/publications/publication/2014-global-investor-statement-on-climate-change. 
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environmental, social and governance (ESG) criteria (Friede et al. 2015). But contrary to 
the investment shares the vast majority of empirical studies has been focused on equity-
linked relations, with only a small portion looking into fixed income or real estate. 
In line with the overall limited research on fixed income SRI there is also hardly empirical 
evidence for a debt instrument that is attracting a fast growing interest of institutional 
asset managers while it was only recently developed: the instrument helps to invest 
according to the principles for responsible investment and is named green bond. The 
green bond market has grown significantly during the last couple of years but still 
represents a niche market. Future success in becoming an important contributor to 
financial markets and sustainable investments will, among others, depend on pricing and 
performance of green bonds. Pricing of green bonds vs. non-green bonds has so far been 
touched only in research from investment banks, advisory firms and the like. A few bonds 
are compared to decide if bonds trade “cheap” or “rich”. Trading strategies are outlined 
(Ridley et al. 2016) or indices compared (Preclaw and Bakshi 2015), but the whole 
population of green bonds has hardly been analyzed so far and existing studies vary in 
design and results (Bloomberg 2017; Karpf and Mandel 2017; Zerbib 2017). Within this 
study we compare green labelled and non-green labelled4 bonds of the same issuers and 
thereby add to the literature that examines pricing of ESG instruments compared to 
conventional assets. 
The majority of ESG studies report positive influence of ESG criteria on corporate financial 
performance. Friede et al. (2015) provide evidence that positive findings in bond studies 
are even higher than in equity studies (63.9% compared to 52.2%). Similar results are 
explored in loan studies (Goss and Roberts 2011). Positive findings can be defined in 
multiple ways. Firms facing stronger external monitoring through effective government 
mechanism are rewarded with lower yields and superior bond ratings (Bhojraj and 
Sengupta 2003). Firms with superior corporate social responsibility (CSR) scores obtain 
cheaper equity financing as in El Ghoul et al. (2011). Recent studies about the corporate 
bond market confirm that bonds with high composite ESG ratings have tighter spreads 
and tend to outperform their peers with lower ESG ratings (see e.g. Polbennikov et al. 
                                                 
4 Bloomberg tags bonds with a green bond label when the use of proceeds is dedicated to mitigating climate 
change and advancing environmental sustainability solutions. Within this study, the term green bonds always 
refers to green labelled bonds as defined by Bloomberg, the term non-green bonds to non-green labelled 
bonds. 
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2016). Likewise investors demand significantly higher stock returns and lenders demand 
significantly higher interest rates for loans of companies with environmental concerns 
(Chava 2014). But research also shows that findings are not always positive. There is 
evidence as well that socially responsible firms do not have lower cost of public debt 
(Menz 2010). Renneboog et al. (2008) conclude that the question whether CSR is priced 
by capital markets is still open. To contribute to this discussion, we analyze the pricing of 
green bonds in comparison to conventional bonds. Our results indicate that green bonds 
are priced slightly different from conventional bonds. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section provides a literature review 
and develops the testable hypotheses. Section 3 presents the data and methodology as 
well as the descriptive statistics. Section 4 documents the empirical results and Section 5 
concludes the paper and outlines possible areas of future research. 
2.2 Sample literature review and hypotheses development 
A green bond is a debt security, whose proceeds are used to support climate-related or 
environmental projects. The ESG approach usually focuses on analyzing the issuer. But 
the same issuing institution (being it agencies, financials, corporates, municipals, 
sovereigns or SPVs) can issue green and/or non-green bonds. For the decision if a bond 
is considered “green” the use of proceeds for specific projects is crucial. 
The green bond market is relatively young, the first green bond was issued in 2007 as a 
climate awareness bond from the European Investment Bank (EIB)5. At the same time, a 
group of Swedish investors, pension funds and investors focused on SRI, developed 
together with Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken (SEB) and the World Bank the concept of 
green bonds. Their first bond was brought to market to a wider range of investors in 
2008.6 During the next couple of years a number of multilateral development banks and 
other financial institutions issued green bonds, with the first green bonds brought to 
market by corporate institutions in 2013. In 2016, 81 billion U.S. dollars of green bonds 
were issued (Climate Bonds Initiative 2017) with the total volume of outstanding green 
bonds amounting to 166 billion U.S. dollars (Ridley and Edwards 2017). 
                                                 
5 http://www.eib.org/investor_relations/press/2007/2007-042-epos-ii-obligation-sensible-au-climat-la-bei-
oeuvre-a-la-protection-du-climat-par-le-biais-de-son-emission-a-l-echelle-de-l-ue.htm?lang=en. 
6 http://treasury.worldbank.org/cmd/htm/GreenBond.html. 
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To avoid information asymmetry between issuers and investors, green bond issues are not 
only accompanied by regular reporting about use of proceeds. Around 60% are also 
certified through an external party in the form of a second party opinion (Boulle et al. 
2016), which could be issued by a profit or non-profit organization. For all market 
participants, issuers, investors as well as the involved consortium, rating agencies and 
certifying institutions, it is necessary to define the “green label”. Efforts have been made 
through the “Green Bond Principles” (ICMA International Capital Markets Association 
2016), first developed by 13 financial institutions in 2014 and updated yearly thereafter. 
The Green Bond Principles are voluntary guidelines, thus market participants also call for 
binding standards which would help develop the market even further (Krimphoff 2016). 
A second party opinion, regular reporting, possibly a sustainability consultant or 
certification and holding proceeds in separate accounts makes the issuance of green bonds 
more expensive than issuing conventional, non-green bonds. External costs for the issuer, 
such as a second party opinion, are estimated to be between 0.3 and 0.6 basis points (bps) 
for a 500 million U.S. dollars issue, depending on the level of work (Ceci 2016). 
Certification of the issue, e.g. through the non-profit organization Climate Bonds 
Initiative, costs 0.1 bps.7 Internal costs for the issuer, like establishing the required 
internal processes for selecting projects and assets, management of proceeds and regular 
reporting, are very much dependent on the issuer and frequency of issuing green bonds. 
The question arises if green bonds and conventional bonds price equally and the issuer 
has to bear additional costs for issuing green. Research has been conducted to analyze if 
increased fixed costs for CSR (called “overinvestment” by Goss and Roberts 2011) harm 
corporate financial performance and thus increase bond holders default risk. Frooman et 
al. (2008) investigate bonds and stocks and come to the conclusion that positive corporate 
social performance reduces risk for long term bondholders without harming stockholders 
through the addition of fixed costs. Stellner et al. (2015) measure credit ratings and zero-
volatility-spreads of corporate bonds and find only weak statistical support that positive 
corporate social performance results in reduced credit risk. On the other hand though, 
they show that superior corporate social performance is rewarded in countries with above 
average ESG performance. Menz (2010) reveals that the risk premium for bonds of 
socially responsible firms does not significantly differ from that of less responsible 
                                                 
7 See https://www.climatebonds.net/standards/certification/get-certified. 
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corporations. Derwall and Koedijk (2009) measure the performance of socially 
responsible bond and balanced funds and their matched conventional fund counterparts. 
Their results indicate that the average SRI fund performed similar to conventional funds, 
while SRI balanced funds modestly outperform the respective conventional ones by 1.3%. 
Oikonomou et al. (2011) investigate the impact of corporate social performance on 
corporate bond spreads and ratings. In general, they show that good corporate social 
performance is rewarded with lower spreads and higher ratings. Arguments for or against 
a positive link between corporate social performance and asset performance usually arise 
from an issuer level. Goss and Roberts (2011) e.g. state that companies with superior 
corporate social performance have a more favorable risk profile. Chava (2014) shows that 
lenders price environmental concerns about issuers such as hazardous waste, toxic 
emissions and climate change concerns. Oikonomou et al. (2011) not only argue from an 
issuer level, but also state that research has shown that not all components of a bond 
spread can be explained, thus corporate social performance could be one of the missing 
pieces to the empirical asset pricing puzzle. We hypothesize that the green component of 
the bond is an additional feature for the investor, which leads to higher demand and thus 
justifies tighter pricing of a green bond. 
Hypothesis 1. Green bonds trade tighter than non-green bonds. 
The investor benefits from investing in green bonds in various ways. In contrast to 
conventional (non-project) bonds he is able to follow the exact use of his proceeds, choose 
projects which fulfill his requirements and has a complementary source of analysis in 
addition to his usual credit analysis. He also benefits from the full faith and credit of the 
issuer, as in case of default he is in line with other creditors of the same ranking. For 
sustainable investors the product range is limited. With green bonds they receive an 
additional product to invest into. Thus it appears reasonable to assume that investors 
would be willing to accept a tighter spread for green bonds than for conventional, non-
green bonds. On the other hand the investor is exposed to risk of “green-washing”, i.e. 
incorrectly labelled green bonds. Since the issuer still has the power to choose if his bond 
is labelled green and no sanctions are put in place if this labelling is incorrect, the investor 
could, in the worst case, be made liable for investing in a non-green product from his 
investor base. Green bonds are issued from the full range of fixed income issuers across 
various currencies, rating classes, maturities and issue sizes. A high percentage of green 
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bonds is issued from government related institutions which on average trade tighter than 
lower rated issuers. This leads to the following hypotheses 
Hypothesis 2. Differences in pricing between green and non-green bonds are larger for lower 
rated bonds. 
Hypothesis 3. Differences in pricing between green and non-green bonds vary across 
industries. 
2.3 Data and methodology 
To analyze if green bonds trade tighter than non-green bonds we use data from 
Bloomberg. We look at the whole population of in August 2016 outstanding, labelled 
green bonds. We exclude 76 municipal bonds and 39 ABS as these are unique in nature, 
issued in various tranches and rarely perfectly comparable to other issues. This leaves us 
with 617 bonds. Since liquidity of the bonds is critical for bond pricing (Driessen 2003; 
Amato and Remolona 2003; Bao et al. 2011; Zerbib 2017) we only include bonds with a 
new issue volume of at least 150 million U.S. dollars equivalent. The price of smaller 
issues might be distorted by a liquidity premium the market charges. We recalculate 23 
local currencies with their exchange rate at the respective date of new issue into U.S. 
dollars. Using 150 million U.S. dollars as a threshold we obtain 199 bonds to proceed our 
analysis with. 
As a next step we include “plain vanilla bonds” only, i.e. we drop 36 structured bonds 
(bonds with call options, caps, floors, multi-coupons, linked to an index, etc.) from our 
sample. We do not drop bonds with make whole calls and calls at par three months before 
maturity of the bond, which have become very common, especially for corporate issuers.8 
We adjust for 13 bonds which are set up twice, as RegS and 144A tranches and include 
one tranche only, the RegS tranche for European issuers and 144A tranche for U.S. as 
well as Asian and Australian issuers. 
                                                 
8 There is evidence that make whole calls may influence pricing of bonds (Mann and Powers 2003; Nayar 
and Stock 2008). Analyzed are groups of bonds only though, a “perfect match” of bonds of the same issuers 
with identical features has not been conducted yet. 
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Bonds are mostly traded over-the-counter (OTC) and reliable pricing data is not as easily 
available as for equities (Duffee 1998; Warga 1991). Since the evolution of TRACE9 a 
number of bond studies use TRACE data (Bessembinder et al. 2006; Edwards et al. 2007; 
Bao et al. 2011) to analyze fixed-income securities. TRACE requires broker-dealers who 
are member firms of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) to report trades 
in eligible securities. Eligible securities as defined by FINRA have to be, among others, 
denominated in U.S. dollars, and not all bond types are eligible yet. Our green labelled 
bonds are a global portfolio of all different types of issuers, supranational organizations, 
development banks, financials, corporates and real estate companies, issued in various 
currencies. Therefore, TRACE has pricing data available for only 21% of our green bonds. 
Thus we use Bloomberg data in this study, as Bloomberg prices all apart from one security 
in question. Bloomberg has various proprietary pricing sources, we consider Bloomberg 
Valuation Services10 (BVAL) as the most suitable source to use. BVAL combines data from 
various pricing sources, TRACE, Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB), 
exchanges and broker quotes. 
To decide if a green bond is trading cheap or rich compared to a similar bond (similar in 
terms of issuer, ranking, currency, maturity and coupon, i.e. fixed or floating) we use 
Bloomberg’s i-spreads11  for the fixed rate bonds. I-spreads are noted in bps above a risk 
free benchmark, usually the swap rate. In contrast to yields they have the advantage to 
separate interest and credit part of the yield. To decide if a similar non-green bond trades 
significantly different from a green bond we just look at the credit part of the yield. 
The i-spreads we use consist of the difference between the yield in question and the 
interpolated swap rate at the same maturity. We consider swap rates as the better proxy 
for the risk-free benchmark in contrast to government securities, in line with previous 
studies (see e.g. Zhu 2006; Hull et al. 2004). The use of swap spreads as a benchmark 
                                                 
9 TRACE is FINRA’s Corporate and Agency Bond Price Dissemination Service that reports OTC secondary 
market transactions in eligible fixed income securities. 
10 See e.g. https://www.bloomberg.com/enterprise/content-data/pricing-data/ for further explanation. 
According to Bloomberg BVAL provides transparent and highly defensible prices of fixed income securities 
across the liquidity spectrum. The methodology combines direct market observations from contributed 
sources with quantitative pricing models to generate BVAL evaluated prices. 
11 Bloomberg’s definition of i-spread: “I-Spread is the interpolated bond spread to a benchmark curve. The I-
Spread is calculated by taking the interpolated, maturity matched yield on a benchmark curve, and 
subtracting that value from the selected bond's yield to worst. This differs from a standard benchmark spread, 
where the selected bond's yield is compared to the nearest already existing point on a curve, rather than an 
interpolated point.” 
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compared to government securities has a number of advantages. Cross-country 
comparisons are more meaningful, “noise” regarding benchmark government securities is 
excluded and the curve is fully available with no need for stripping (Mann and Fabozzi 
2013). In a number of countries the swap market is also more liquid than the government 
bonds market. Bloomberg lists more than 220 swap curves, depending on currency, tenor 
etc. Our bonds are issued in 23 different currencies and for our data we look at the i-
spread above 25 different swap curves. For the floating rate notes, we use the discount 
margin (i.e. spread above their respective benchmark, Euribor, Libor etc.). We download 
daily historic spreads since issuance of the green bonds up to October 2016. For all 
spreads we use the bid side of the market, transaction costs are not examined. We also 
do not separate the new issue premium of bonds, which may “cheapen” bonds by a few 
bps compared to already outstanding bonds of the same issuers in the first couple of 
trading days. 
To avoid the problem of heterogeneity among bonds (see e.g. Roberts and Viscione 1984) 
we decide not to use rating classes or indices to compare our sample but to use matched 
pairs instead. Matched pairs have been used in previous bond studies. Maul and Schiereck 
(2017) e.g. provide a comprehensive overview of matched pairs used in bond event 
studies. We match each green bond with two comparable non-green bonds, one with a 
shorter maturity, the other one with a longer maturity. In order to be considered 
comparable bonds, the non-green bonds have to fulfill the following criteria: (i) bonds 
must be from the same issuer as the green bond; (ii) bonds must have the same ranking 
as the green bond; (iii) bonds must be denominated in the same currency as the green 
bond; (iv) bonds must not be structured (callable, puttable, convertible, dual currency, 
dual coupon, step up/down coupon, index linked); (v) bonds must be either fixed or 
floating, depending on the green bonds; (vi) issue size must be at least 150 million U.S. 
dollars equivalent; (vii) bonds must be secured/unsecured, depending on the green 
bonds. For every green bond we take the two comparable non-green bonds with the 
closest maturity to their green counterpart. 17 bonds do not have two comparable non-
green bonds, so this leaves us with a subsample of 132 green bonds to analyze, issued by 
73 different counterparts. 
As a next step we define a historic time frame for our analysis. To avoid including bonds 
that only have a very short remaining maturity and thus no representative trading, we 
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decide not to use historic prices up to date, but a past period instead. We take the 1st of 
October 2015 to 31st of March 2016 and download daily i-spreads12 for the comparable 
bonds. If the non-green bonds are issued after the green bond or matured before our cut-
off date for historic prices, 31st of March 2016, we take the next closest bonds for which 
the full data set is available. If no full data set is available, we take the closest bond to the 
green bond. 30 of our green bonds were issued after March 31st 2016 and for 37 green 
bonds not both comparable non-green bonds are available (18 green bonds do not have 
a shorter comparable bond, 14 green bonds do not have a longer comparable bond, for 2 
green bonds their comparable bonds were only issued after our sample period, for 3 green 
bonds their comparable non-green bonds had issue amounts < 150mm USD equivalent). 
We also exclude 1 bond which is not rated and 1 bond which was only outstanding a few 
days during our sample period, so this leaves us with 63 green bonds and 126 non-green 
bonds to analyze. Table 2.1 provides an overview of the sample selection procedure. 
Table 2.1: Sample selection procedure 
This table shows the sample selection procedure to compare green labelled and non-green labelled bonds 
during the investigation period from October 1st 2015 to March 31st 2016. The final sample is used for the 
empirical analysis throughout the paper. 
  Securities 
Initial sample 732 
Less municipal bonds -76 
Less asset backed securities -39 
Less volume < 150 million U.S. dollars equivalent -418 
Less structured bonds -36 
Less bonds set up twice, RegS as well as 144A  -13 
Less bond not priced by Bloomberg -1 
Less no comparable bonds available -17 
Less bonds issued after sample period -30 
Less not both comparable bonds available for sample period -37 
Less "other" -2 
Final sample 63 
 
The final sample includes 39 issues from government related institutions (such as 
development banks, supranational organizations, cities etc.), 12 issues from financial 
firms, 8 from corporate issuers and 4 from real estate companies (see Appendix A.1). The 
                                                 
12 For simplicity we use the expression i-spread in this study for both, the i-spread above the swap rate for 
the bonds with the fixed coupon as well as the discount margin above the reference rate for the floating rate 
securities. 
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(2.2) 
high number of supranational organizations and other government related institutions is 
also reflected in the high average rating. According to previous literature (e.g. Norden 
and Weber 2004; Friewald et al. 2012; Kiesel and Schiereck 2015) we recalculate the 
ratings of our sample by using a numerical 17 grade scale (AAA/ Aaa=1, AA+/Aa1=2,.., 
CCC/Caa1 and below =17). The mean rating of green and non-green bonds is 3.05 
(Aa2/AA). The average remaining maturity of the sample at the end of our sample period 
is 5 years. We look at 7,032 daily observations of green bonds. Table 2.2 provides 
descriptive statistics of the i-spreads of our sample. 
Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics for daily i-spreads of green bonds 
This table shows descriptive statistics of daily i-spreads of our sample of green bonds for the investigation 
period October 1st 2015 to March 31st 2016. Mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum i-spreads 
are shown in bps. I-spread is the interpolated spread above the bond’s respective swap benchmark for fixed 
rate bonds and discount margin for floating rate bonds. 
    Standard          
  Mean Deviation Min Max N 
AAA 12.913 25.000 -25.734 68.458 3241 
AA  40.833 38.148 -14.813 144.792 1445 
A 79.618 37.905 19.018 205.967 1691 
BBB 150.842 62.586 41.048 260.323 655 
Total 47.539 55.679 -25.734 260.323 7,032 
As a next step we use linear interpolation to align the i-spreads of the two comparable 
non-green bonds with the respective green bond. For the linear interpolation we use Isaac 
Newton’s formula 
𝑖𝑀 = 𝑖𝑠 +  
𝑖𝑙−𝑖𝑠
𝑡𝑙− 𝑡𝑠
 (𝑡𝑔 −  𝑡𝑠) 
where 𝑖𝑀 is the model i-spread of the non-green bonds, 𝑖𝑠 the empirical i-spread of the 
shorter non-green bond, 𝑖𝑙 the empirical i-spread of the longer non-green bond, 𝑡𝑙 the 
time to maturity in months of the non-green longer bond, 𝑡𝑠 the time to maturity in 
months of the shorter non-green bond and 𝑡𝑔 the time to maturity in months of the green 
bond. Thereafter, we compare the daily difference between the empirical i-spread 𝑖𝑔 and 
the theoretical i-spread 𝑖𝑀.  
𝑖𝑑,𝑡 = 𝑖𝑔,𝑡 −  𝑖𝑀,𝑡 
 
 
  
 
(2.1) 
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For our sample period we obtain 7,032 daily observations for green bonds and 14,064 
daily observations for non-green bonds. We also check for ESG issuer ratings. We take 
data from Bloomberg and look at ratings from the providers Sustainalytics and 
RobeccoSAM. 11 of the issuers and 12 of the issues of our sample hold a rating from at 
least one of the two firms. Table 2.3 shows descriptive statistics of green and non-green 
bonds. 
Table 2.3: Descriptive statistics of green and non-green bonds 
This table shows descriptive statistics of our sample of green and non-green bonds for the investigation period 
October 1st 2015 to March 31st 2016. ESG rating is on issuer level, counted are issuers that have a rating by 
one of the firms RobeccoSAM or Sustainalytics as shown on Bloomberg. The mean remaining maturity is 
calculated from the last day of the investigation period. Amount issued is shown in U.S. dollars equivalent, 
recalculated using the exchange rate at the issue date of the respective bond. 
  Green non-green 
Issuer 39 39 
Government related issues 39 78 
Financials 12 24 
Corporates 8 16 
Real Estate 4 8 
median rating 3.05 (AA) 3.05 (AA) 
ESG rating (issuer) 11 11 
Amount issued (mean) 810 million 1.7 billion 
Amount issued (mean) AAA  959 million 2.1 billion 
Amount issued (mean) AA  689 million 1.8 billion 
Amount issued (mean) A  708 million 1.2 billion 
Amount issued (mean) BBB 593 million 535 million 
Remaining maturity 5 years 5 years 
Countries 15 15 
Currencies 8 8 
Total (issues) 63 126 
Total (observations) 7,032 14,064 
2.4 Empirical results 
To obtain a better overview we group the bonds into rating categories from AAA to BBB. 
Our group of bonds does not include any non-investment grade bonds. For every split 
rated bond we use the highest rating category. The results of our analysis are presented 
in Table 2.4. The daily delta between green and non-green bonds 𝑖𝑑,𝑡 is across all rating 
classes more negative than positive. AA, A and BBB rated green bonds trade more days 
and also on average tighter than their comparable non-green bonds. On the contrary AAA 
rated green bonds trade more days wider than their comparable non-green bonds and 
their average spread is wider than the average spread of the comparable non-green bonds. 
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Table 2.4: I-spreads of green bonds vs. non-green bonds 
This table shows the daily (t) (October 1st 2015-March 31st 2016) delta between green and non-green 
(interpolated) bonds, 𝑖𝑑 . The sample is sorted by rating classes, spreads green 𝑖𝑔 and non-green 𝑖𝑀 are shown 
in interpolated spread terms (bps) above the bond’s respective swap benchmark for fixed rate bonds and 
discount margin for floating rate bonds. Daily 𝑖𝑑 (tightest and widest), mean and median are also shown in 
bps. 
 
Rating n 
bonds 
Tightest 
daily 𝑖𝑑  
Widest 
daily 𝑖𝑑  
Mean 
𝑖𝑑 
Median 
𝑖𝑑 
t 
tighter 
t 
wider 
Mean 
𝑖𝑔 
Mean  
𝑖𝑀 
AAA 29 -14.51 8.60 0.45 0.64 1,300 1,941 12.91 12.47 
AA 14 -15.90 10.12 -0.99 -0.64 934 511 40.83 41.82 
A 15 -48.70 43.60 -3.88 -0.83 883 808 79.62 83.50 
BBB 5 -32.15 24.57 -2.69 -1.00 367 288 150.84 153.54 
Total 63 -48.70 43.60 -1.18 0.04 3,484 3,548 47.54 48.72 
 
The arithmetic mean of the daily delta between green and non-green comparable bonds 
shows single A rated green bonds being the richest compared to their non-green 
counterparts. The delta is relatively small though, green single A bonds trade on average 
3.88 bps (4.87%) tighter, AA rated bonds 0.99 bps (2.42%) tighter and BBB rated green 
bonds 2.69 bps (1.78%) tighter than their comparable non-green bonds. Overall, green 
bonds trade 1.18 bps (2.48%) tighter than their comparable non-green counterparts 
during our sample period. AAA rated green bonds on the other hand trade 0.45 bps 
(3.49%) wider. 
The correlation between green and non-green i-spreads is high, for most rating classes 
0.99, for single A rated bonds 0.94. Figure 2.1 graphically displays average spreads of 
green bonds and their comparable non-green bonds from October 1st 2015 to March 31st 
2016 on a daily basis, grouped by rating classes. Single A rated green and non-green 
bonds clearly show the largest pricing differential among ratings examined. 
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Figure 2.1: Green bonds vs. non-green bonds 
This figure shows the development of green and non-green daily i-spreads between October 1st 2015 and 
March 31st 2016, in bps. Spreads are calculated in daily means of the sample, non-green bond spreads are 
interpolated spreads of comparable bonds. 
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Panel C: A rated green bonds vs. A rated non-green bonds 
 
Panel D: BBB rated green bonds vs. BBB rated non-green bonds 
 
To further investigate if green bonds are priced significantly different from their non-
green comparable bonds we use the non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sum as well as the 
parametric two sample t-test. We use the same classification as before, i.e. group our 
sample by rating classes. We also retain for the green bonds the market observed spread, 
for their non-green comparable bonds the interpolated spread of the two bonds 
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surrounding the green bond in question. Results of the analysis are presented in Table 
2.5. 
Table 2.5: Results Wilcoxon rank sum and t-test for ratings and industries 
This table shows the p-value results of the Wilcoxon rank sum and t-test, grouped by ratings and industries. 
I-spreads between green and non-green bonds are analyzed for investigation period October 1st 2015-March 
31st 2016. It also shows the correlation r between i-spreads of green and non-green bonds, grouped by ratings 
and industries for the same sample period. 
  Total 
sample 
AAA AA A BBB 
N 14,064 6,482 2,890 3,382 1,310 
p value Wilcoxon rank-
sum  
0.107 0.312 0.387 0.000 0.316 
p value t-test 0.209 0.474 0.489 0.002 0.419 
r green, non-green 0.989 0.993 0.994 0.936 0.986 
  Total 
sample 
Government 
related 
Financials Corporates Real Estate 
N 14,064 9,222 1,906 1,888 1,048 
p value Wilcoxon rank-
sum  
0.107 0.753 0.000 0.000 0.126 
p value t-test 0.209 0.732 0.000 0.071 0.566 
r green, non-green 0.989 0.995 0.947 0.957 0.995 
 
For the full sample the statistic results show that green and non-green bonds are not 
priced significantly different. Thus despite an economically observed tighter pricing of 
green bonds we cannot find statistical significance and need to reject the hypothesis, that 
overall green bonds trade tighter than non-green bonds. The same results are captured 
for rating classes AAA, AA and BBB. For single A rated securities, on the other hand, the 
Wilcoxon rank sum as well as the t-test indicate significance, which shows that i-spreads 
of the two samples green and non-green bonds are different. The results provide support 
to our second hypothesis, that differences in pricing are larger for lower rated bonds. With 
the exception of rating class BBB (the smallest of our sample) the delta between i-spreads 
of green and non-green bonds becomes larger for lower rated rating classes on an absolute 
level. Looking at a relative level this cannot be confirmed though. Thus we partially accept 
our second hypothesis. 
To test the results further we separate our sample of bonds by type of industry. We use 
the group “government related”, which includes all supranational organizations, 
development banks, cities and other government related issuers. We additionally use the 
groups “financials”, “corporates” and “real estate”. This time Wilcoxon rank sum and t-
test show significance for groups financials (both tests) and corporates (Wilcoxon rank 
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sum test). Group financials includes ratings AAA, AA and A, group corporates includes 
ratings AA, A and BBB. The results of the tests indicate already, that we may be able to 
support our third hypothesis that differences in pricing between green and non-green 
bonds vary across industries. 
Since the issue size of financials and corporates compared to our government related 
bonds tends to be smaller and also the issue size of our non-green bonds tends to be larger 
in most cases than the issue size of the green bonds, we also test the influence of issue 
size to our sample of bonds. In addition, we want to test for variables which show 
significance in the Wilcoxon rank sum test, namely industries government related and 
financials. We also want to investigate features like maturity and currency of the issues. 
We use a panel regression with the daily delta between green and non-green i-spreads as 
the dependent variable and the International Securities Identification Number (ISIN) of 
the bonds as the cluster variable. Our first Model, 1.1, is a random-effects model with the 
general term 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
+  𝛽5𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
 
where 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 is the delta of the daily i-spread 𝑖𝑔 of the green bonds and the respective model 
spread of the interpolated non-green bonds 𝑖𝑀 at date t, Size green is the logarithmized 
issue size of the green bonds recalculated at date of issuance into U.S. dollars, Size non-
green is the logarithmized issue size of the non-green bonds recalculated at date of 
issuance into U.S. dollars, Financials is a dummy variable, which takes value one if the 
issuer is a financial company and zero otherwise, Government is a dummy variable, which 
takes value one if the issuer is a government related firm and zero otherwise, Currency is 
a dummy variable, which takes value one if the issue is denominated in Euro or U.S. 
dollars and zero otherwise, Maturity is the remaining maturity of the issue, 𝛽 is the 
coefficient for the independent variables, 𝛼 is the intercept, 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is the between-entity error 
and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 the within-entity error. We do not account for other firm specific variables, such 
as leverage, market capitalization, interest rate coverage ratio etc., as conducted in 
previous literature (Collin-Dufresne et al. 2001; Bhojraj and Sengupta 2003) as the bonds 
we compare are issued by the same companies. An overview of the dependent and 
independent variables used throughout this paper is shown in Table 2.6. 
(2.3) 
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Table 2.6: Overview of variables 
Variable Description 
 
Delta of daily i-spread between green and interpolated non-green bonds 
Size Green Logarithmized issue amount of green bonds in U.S. dollars 
Size non-Green Logarithmized issue amount of non-green bonds in U.S. dollars 
Financials Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the issuer of the bond is a financial firm,  
0 otherwise 
Government Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the issuer is government related, 0 otherwise 
Maturity Maturity of the green bond 
Currency Dummy variable that takes value 1 if currency is Euro or U.S. dollars, 0 otherwise 
ESG Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the issuer is rated by RobeccoSAM or 
Sustainalystics, 0 otherwise 
Rating Highest rating of S&P, Moody's and Fitch, ratings have been coded  
from 1 (AAA) to 4 (BBB) 
AAA Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the rating is AAA, 0 otherwise 
AA  Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the rating is AA, 0 otherwise 
A Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the rating is A, 0 otherwise 
BBB Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the rating is BBB, 0 otherwise 
We also use a population-averaged model, Model 1.2, which is defined as 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽4𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼 + 𝑟𝑖𝑡 
 
 
with the same dependent and independent variables, clustered by ISIN, 𝛼 as the intercept 
and 𝑟𝑖𝑡 the error term. Model results are presented in Table 2.7. 
Table 2.7: Random-effects and population-averaged panel regression (clustered by ISIN) 
This table shows coefficients of model results for a random effects (Model 1.1, 2.1, 3.1, 4.1) and a population-
averaged panel regression (Model 1.2, 2.2, 3.2, 4.2) testing significance of various independent variables to 
dependent variable 𝑖𝑑, which is the delta between empirical observed i-spreads of green bonds and 
interpolated i-spreads of non-green bonds. For a detailed description of panel variables please see Table 2.6. 
*shows significance p<0.05, **shows significance p<0.01, ***shows significance p<0.001 
  Model 
 1.1 
Model 
1.2 
Model 
2.1 
Model 
2.2 
Model 
3.1 
Model 
3.2 
Model 
4.1 
Model 
4.2 
Size green 0.295 0.295 0.060 0.061 0.016 0.017 -0.287 -0.288 
Size non-green -0.542 -0.542 -0.571 -0.573 -0.874 -0.876 -0.745 -0.745 
Financials -6.003  -6.003*  -3.713 -3.712 
    
Government 1.859 1.859 6.646  6.647*  7.930*  7.931*  
  
Currency 1.063 1.063 1.548 1.549 2.260 2.261 2.029 2.029 
Maturity 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
ESG 
  
6.034  6.033*   7.896* 7.895**  4.277 4.278 
AAA         4.021 4.021 7.715 7.715 
AA          1.661 1.661 4.743 4.743 
A         1.505 1.506 -0.138 -0.139 
N 7032 7032 7032 7032 7032 7032 7032 7032 
rho 0.740 
 
0.730 
 
0.731 
 
0.746 
 
(2.4) 
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Results of the population-averaged Model 1.2 show that contrary to expectations, neither 
volume nor currency are significant variables, but the coefficient for the dummy variable 
financials is significant and negative. 
In addition, we test if the existence of an ESG rating has an influence on the delta of our 
spreads. For the ESG rating we also create a dummy variable, which takes value one if 
the issuer has at least one ESG rating from Sustainalytics or RobecoSAM and zero 
otherwise. We use the same panel regression models as before and create our third Model 
2.1 for the random-effects panel regression, Model 2.2 for the population-averaged 
regression, both including the ESG dummy variable. This time the population-averaged 
Model 2.2 indicates that the ESG as well as the Government dummy variables are 
significant with a positive coefficient. In a further step we include dummy variables for 
each rating class apart from BBB, which take value one if the rating is AAA, AA or A and 
zero otherwise, and leave out the dummy variable Financials. We test the same models as 
before, Model 3.1 with a random-effects panel regression and Model 3.2 with a 
population-averaged panel regression. This time both models, Model 3.1 as well as Model 
3.2 show significance for ESG as well as the Government dummy. In a last step we leave 
out the dummy variable Government and conduct the same analysis using Model 4.1 for 
the random-effects regression and Model 4.2 for the population-averaged regression. This 
time no variables are significant. We use the same regressions with the cluster variable 
issuer to test our models. Nearly all variables show high levels of significance. Results are 
presented in Table 2.8. 
Table 2.8: Random-effects and population-averaged panel regression (clustered by issuer) 
This table shows coefficients of model results for a random effects (Model 1.1, 2.1, 3.1, 4.1) and a population-
averaged panel regression (Model 1.2, 2.2, 3.2, 4.2) testing significance of various independent variables to 
dependent variable 𝑖𝑑, which is the delta between empirical observed i-spreads of green bonds and 
interpolated i-spreads of non-green bonds. For a detailed description of panel variables please see Table 2.6. 
*shows significance p<0.05, **shows significance p<0.01, ***shows significance p<0.001 
  Model 1.1 Model 1.2 Model 2.1 Model  2.2 Model 3.1 Model 3.2 Model 4.1 Model 4.2 
Size green 0.276 0.285 0.274 0.268 .690*** .723** .687*** .709* 
Size  
non-green 
-1.352*** -1.310*** -1.354*** -1.319*** -.630*** -.682** -.636*** -.706** 
Financials -5.297 -5.209** -3.395 -3.356 
    
Government 3.549 3.561* 8.007* 7.991*** 23.315*** 22.109*** 
  
Currency 2.718*** 2.614*** 2.726*** 2.652*** 1.580*** 1.495** 1.565*** 1.435* 
Maturity -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -.0007*** -.001*** -.001*** -.000** 
ESG 
  
5.732 5.697** 10.731** 10.347*** -3.546 -2.941 
AAA 
    
-6.098 -5.396 2.062 2.552 
AA  
    
-14.530*** -13.291*** -12.824*** -10.940** 
A 
    
8.047* 7.352** 9.386* 8.152* 
N 7032 7032 7032 7032 7032 7032 7032 7032 
rho 0.740 
 
0.730 
 
0.722 
 
0.734 
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The results of our models show that we are able to accept our third hypothesis that 
differences in pricing between green and non-green bonds vary across industries. Neither 
issue size of the bond nor maturity or currency have significant impact on the pricing 
differentials, but rather the industry (notably government related and financials), as well 
as the existence of an ESG rating have a significant influence. During our sample period, 
government related green bonds tend to trade marginally wider than non-green bonds, 
with a positive coefficient of the dummy variable Government. Financial green bonds tend 
to trade tighter than their comparable non-green counterparts, with a negative coefficient 
of the dummy variable Financials. One possible explanation for this difference in pricing 
can be seen from an issuer perspective. Government related issuers are actively promoting 
growth of the green bond market and may fear that tight pricing of green bonds compared 
to non-green bonds might hurt market growth. The EIB e.g. states on their climate 
awareness bonds factsheet13 that “… EIB is committed to provide leadership in climate 
finance”. The same factsheet points out that no premium is charged for their climate 
awareness bonds, climate awareness bonds are priced like other EIB bonds of comparable 
size and maturity. Similar statements are made by Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) 
in their brochure about green bonds (KfW 2016). 
Financial issuers on the other hand might be more pricing sensitive. A different 
explanation could result from an investor perspective. Dedicated sustainability, green 
bond and ESG funds are naturally looking for the highest return for their investor base 
and their demand for single A rated securities might be larger than for AAA and AA rated 
securities. On the other hand BBB securities might be too close to non-investment grade 
and investors might fear downgrade rating migration. We have to bear in mind though 
that our group of BBBs was small, for larger groups results may be different. Looking at 
our results investors might come to the conclusion that AAA and government related 
green bonds offer good value compared to non-green bonds. However, single A rated and 
financial non-green bonds might offer better value compared to green bonds if the 
investor does not need to buy “green”. Our dummy variable ESG is significant and, 
surprisingly, positive. This could mean that if an issuer has an ESG rating, dedicated ESG 
investors might not be “forced” to buy a (often smaller) green bond issue but can instead 
                                                 
13 http://www.eib.org/investor_relations/documents/eib-cab-factsheet.htm 
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also buy the comparable non-green bonds, since the issuer and thus all issues may be 
considered ESG conform. 
2.5 Conclusion 
The majority of empirical research on ESG so far documents that financial instruments of 
companies that follow the ESG approach perform better than financial instruments of 
companies who do not follow this approach. We look at green and comparable, non-green 
bonds over a sample period from 1st of October 2015 to 31st of March 2016. Comparing 
daily i-spreads of 7,032 green bonds and 14,064 non-green bonds, we first provide 
evidence that green bonds on average do not trade significantly tighter than their 
counterparts. However, pricing differentials are economically most obvious and show 
statistical significance for single A rated bonds, with green bonds trading 3.88 bps 
(4.87%) tighter than comparable non-green bonds. Green bonds with rating classes AA 
and BBB trade economically tighter than their non-green comparable bonds, but we could 
not find any statistical significance. Although issuing green bonds is more expensive than 
issuing non-green bonds, the difference in pricing between green and non-green bonds 
for rating classes AA, A and BBB could potentially make up for external costs the issuer 
has to bear, like a second party opinion and a possible certification of the transaction. 
Analyzing the pricing differentials further, our results indicate that significant are neither 
maturity, nor volume or currency, but rather industries, namely government related and 
financial issuers, as well as the existence of an ESG issuer rating. Government related 
green bonds trade marginally wider than comparable non-green bonds, on the contrary 
financial green bonds trade tighter than non-green bonds. 
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3 The impact of expected regulatory changes: The case of 
banks following the 2016 U.S. election14 
 
Abstract 
We analyze bank stocks and CDS spreads around the U.S. presidential election on 
November 8, 2016. We find a strong rally in bank stocks combined with an overall 
widening in bank CDS spreads during the days after the announcement of the election 
result. Following Donald Trump’s victory, market participants appear to anticipate a 
lowering of financial sector regulation, particularly with respect to the Dodd-Frank Act. 
In addition, we find that G-SIBs reacted more positive than non-G-SIBs, with stocks having 
larger gains and CDS remaining relatively stable. Non-G-SIB stocks, on the other hand, 
gained less and their CDS widened, indicating less favorable changes from deregulation 
than for G-SIBs. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In the night from November 8 to November 9, 2016, it was officially announced that the 
Republican Donald Trump won the U.S. presidential election and will become the 45th 
president of the United States. Trump’s victory came as a surprise to the vast majority of 
capital market participants. Following Trump’s inauguration, market participants expect 
a repeal or significant reshaping of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street reform and consumer 
protection act (Dodd–Frank Act 2010). Two days after his election, Donald Trump already 
published on his webpage that the Financial Services Implementation Team will be 
working on dismantling the Dodd-Frank Act,15 a promise, he had given initially in an 
interview to Reuters on May 17, 2016, during his election campaign.16 The Dodd-Frank 
Act was adopted by the Democrats in 2010 in the wake of the financial crisis in order to 
preserve financial stability and avert another crisis. It created new regulatory authorities 
and control mechanisms, limits the banks’ proprietary trading activities and banks’ 
                                                 
14 This chapter is based on an article published in Finance Research Letters, Volume 22, 2017, Hachenberg 
B., Kiesel F., Kolaric S., Schiereck D.: The impact of expected regulatory changes: The case of banks following 
the 2016 U.S. election, Pages 268-273, ISSN 1544-6123, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2016.12.021. 
15 https://web.archive.org/web/20161111062731/https:/www.greatagain.gov/policy/financial-services. 
html. 
16 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-trump-banks-idUSKCN0Y900J. 
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investments in hedge funds and private equity funds (Volcker Rule). At the same time, 
the Dodd-Frank Act regulates derivative products, which were partially responsible for 
the subprime mortgage crisis. 
Changes in regulation result in a change in security prices and have been analyzed 
through event studies beginning in the 1980s (Schwert 1981) and numerously thereafter 
(e.g. Eyssell and Arshadi 1990; Veronesi and Zingales 2010). Schäfer et al. (2016) come 
to the conclusion that recent regulatory changes, notably the Dodd-Frank Act and Volcker 
rule, succeeded in reducing bail-out expectations for banks relative to the post-bail-out 
level and were linked to a decline in bank stock prices and a widening in bank CDS 
spreads. Regulatory changes, being the implementation of new regulatory rules or 
deregulation, are discussed by various different parties, not only politicians, but also 
experts and lobbying groups, and naturally take a long time to be finalized. Any leakage 
of new information, anticipation of changes or even rumours are likely to effect security 
prices. Therefore, defining the right point in time of an event is key for the use of event 
studies. Hence, using event studies for regulatory changes is particularly challenging 
(Lamdin 2001). The unexpected victory of Donald Trump offers an ideal setting to test 
the true impact of anticipated changes to regulation on capital markets. His earlier 
comments about deregulation and dismantling the Dodd-Frank Act (e.g. to the news 
agency Reuters, May 17, 2016 and the New York Economic Club September 15, 2016)17 
have only gained significance with his election victory. The event of having both a 
Republican president and a Republican-controlled senate and the resulting policy changes 
that may now take place gain special attention (Roberts 1990) and pave the way for a 
regulatory reform. With two vacant Fed governor seats to fill, as well as a nomination for 
the powerful post of vice chair of supervision, Trump is expected to change the central 
bank setting and with it monetary and regulatory oversight very quickly. 
The aim of this study is to empirically analyze the reaction of bank stocks to the outcome 
of the U.S. presidential election in 2016 and the expected deregulation that is to follow. 
Policy changes are associated with increased volatilities and the announcement of a 
change in government frequently leads to a drop in share prices (Pástor and Veronesi 
2012). However, in this case, after Asian markets fell sharply the day following the 
election, and European markets opened initially weaker, the Dow Jones Industrial 
                                                 
17 http://time.com/4495507/donald-trump-economy-speech-transcript/. 
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Average closed gaining 1.4% and the FTSE 100 ended the day increasing by 1%. Stock 
prices of American banks climbed during the days following the election in a manner not 
seen since before the financial crisis in expectations of a significant Wall Street reform. 
Since the expected reforms would not only influence American banks, we anticipate a 
spillover to banks worldwide and therefore analyze banks globally. As a stronger effect 
can be assumed for closely regulated institutions, we divide global banks into two 
subgroups, G-SIBs18 and non-G-SIBs. 
We additionally look beyond bank stocks reaction to Trump’s victory and also investigate 
the reaction of banks’ CDS spreads. Banks have to make important economic choices 
based on the expected future economic policy choices of governments and constraints 
from regulation (Brogaard and Detzel 2015). In this context, the outcome of the U.S. 
elections can be seen as a drastic change in government policy. We use CDS spreads and 
stock returns to estimate the impact of the result of the U.S. election on global banks. CDS 
are a marked-based measure of firm risk and changes in CDS spreads directly relate to 
changes in firms’ risk (Jorion and Zhang 2007). Dismantling the Dodd-Frank Act would 
enable banks to shift into riskier business, like proprietary trading and engagements in 
private equity funds, again. 
3.2 Sample construction and methodology 
The goal of the present study is to analyze stock and CDS market reaction following the 
announcement of Donald Trump’s victory of the 2016 U.S. presidential election. The 
result of the election was disclosed during the night from November 8 to November 9, 
2016, allowing capital markets to respond to the election result on Wednesday, November 
9, 2016, which we treat as the official announcement day. 
For our sample construction, we first collect all financial institutions with CDS and stock 
data available through Datastream. We thereby exclude all insurance and real estate 
firms, non-bank holding companies, and other miscellaneous investment firms. We 
additionally dropped firms with functions related to depository banking and credit card 
companies (e.g. Western Union, American Express). Following the majority of prior 
                                                 
18 As defined by The Financial Stability Board (FSB) in consultation with Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision and national authorities, http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/2015-update-of-list-of-
global-systemically-important-banks-G-SIBs.pdf. 
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research on CDS (e.g. Jorion and Zhang 2007; Kiesel et al. 2016; Schiereck et al. 2016) 
we use the five year senior CDS mid spread in U.S. dollars. We therefore also dropped all 
observations with either insufficient CDS spread or stock price data during the 120 days 
estimation period, ending 6 days prior to the event day. This sample selection process left 
us with a total of 71 financial institutions from 25 countries. We further divide our sample 
into G-SIBs and non-G-SIBs, as particularly G-SIBs may benefit from regulatory changes, 
as they currently face the strongest regulatory requirements of all financial institutions 
(for a full list of our sample banks see Appendix A.2). 
To properly capture the short-term impact of the expected deregulation on banks’ stock 
prices and CDS spreads, we estimate a system of regressions using a SUR framework 
(Zellner 1962). This approach is better suited than the traditional two stage market model 
event study for regulatory or similar events, because all firms are affected at the same 
time and in the SUR framework the regressions are estimated simultaneously, thereby 
accounting for potential cross-correlations (Binder 1985). This approach has been 
frequently used in prior reseach (e.g. Doidge and Dyck 2015; Schäfer et al. 2016; 
Schiereck et al. 2016) and for stock returns the SUR model takes the following form: 
 
𝑅1𝑡 = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑀𝑡 + 𝜏1𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝜀1𝑡 
⋯ 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑡 + 𝜏𝑖𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
⋯ 
𝑅𝑁𝑡 = 𝛼𝐼 + 𝛽𝑁𝑅𝑀𝑡 + 𝜏𝑁𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝜀𝑁𝑡 
(3.1) 
 
where Rit are the daily stock returns for firm i with with i = 1,…,N, Rmt are the benchmark 
returns of the local value-weighted Datastream market index of the country of origin of 
the respective firm, while αi and βi are the firm specific regression coefficients, 
representing the intercept and sensitivity of firm i to the local benchmark index, and εit is 
the error term. Event is a vector of dummy variables for our event, which is equal to 1 on 
the event day, the [0; 0] event window, during 5 days surrounding the event, the 
[−2;+2] event window, and the 11 days surrounding the event, the [−5;+5] event 
window. The cumulative abnormal returns for each firm (CARi) is calculated by 
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multiplying each τi by the number of days in the event window (Doidge and Dyck 2015). 
We estimate the regression using 120 trading days, ending 6 days prior to the event day. 
Abnormal CDS spread changes are estimated on basis of a constant return model, 
following the approach of Schäfer et al. (2016) and Schiereck et al. (2016). The difference 
to the market model described in Equation (1) is the absence of a market return. We 
therefore estimate: 
ΔCDS1𝑡 = 𝜇1 + 𝜏1𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝜀1𝑡 
⋯ 
ΔCDS𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜏𝑖𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
⋯ 
ΔCDS𝑁𝑡 = 𝜇𝑁 + 𝜏𝑁𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝜀𝑁𝑡 
(3.2) 
 
The left-hand side of the equation, ΔCDSit, is the difference in the CDS spread of firm i 
from t-1 to t. On the right-hand side of the equation, μi denotes the mean of first 
differences of the CDS spread changes of firm i during the estimation window. In all other 
aspects the procedure follows those of the stock returns. 
3.3 Results 
The results of the stock event study are presented in Table 3.1. We find an overall positive 
reaction for our entire sample of banks. Especially during the longer event windows, 
highly significant and positive average abnormal returns of up to 4.43% during the 
[−5;+5] day event window can be observed. Splitting the sample into G-SIBs and non-
G-SIBs provides further insights into the differential effect the election results had on 
these financial institutions. G-SIBs, on average, experienced highly significant positive 
returns, which are particularly pronounced during the [−2;+2] and [−5;+5] day event 
windows with 6.32% and 7.71%, respectively. For non-G-SIBs, on the other hand, the 
returns are much lower. For these institutions, the average abnormal return is 
insignificant on the announcement day [0;0] and amount to only 2.88% during the 
[−5;+5] day event window. The average abnormal returns for non-G-SIBs are 
significantly lower than for G-SIBs for all event windows. 
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Table 3.1: Stock event study results 
This table shows the stock event study results from the SUR analyses using a 120 day estimation period for 
the 71 sample banks. The sample banks are further divided into G-SIBs and non-G-SIBs. The average return 
refers to the unadjusted return, while the average abnormal return refers to the abnormal returns estimated 
using the SUR analyses. The returns are given in percentage points and the values for the event day [0; 0] 
and the [−2; +2] and [−5; +5] event window are shown. Average abnormal returns are tested for equality 
to zero and the associated t-values are given in brackets. The equality of means and medians between the 
two samples are tested for statistical significance using the two sample t-test and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test. 
The associated t-values and Z-scores are given in brackets. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
   
Table 3.2 shows the results for the CDS spread changes. Overall, a significant widening 
in CDS spread levels can be observed. However, when the sample is split into G-SIBs and 
non-G-SIBs, it can be seen that this increase is driven entirely by non-G-SIBs. Non-G-SIBs 
experience a highly significant widening of their CDS spreads of up to 6.73 bps during 
the [−5;+5] day event window. For G-SIBs, on the other hand, CDS spreads barely 
change and their spread changes are significantly lower than for non-G-SIBs. This result, 
in combination with the stock results, provides evidence that larger, more closely 
regulated institutions stand to benefit from changes in regulation, as stockholders gained 
significant positive returns, while there appear to be no negative consequences in credit 
markets for these institutions. In contrast, even though stockholders of non-G-SIBs 
benefited to a certain extent as well, their debtholders did not. This may indicate that 
these banks may shift into more risky business activities as a result of lower anticipated 
regulatory levels, which will be more beneficial to their stockholders than their 
debtholders. 
 
 
 
  Event day [0; 0]  Event window [−2; +2]  Event window 
[−5; +5] 
 
n 
Average  
return (%) 
Average 
abnormal  
return (%)  
Average 
return (%) 
Average 
abnormal 
return (%)  
Average 
return 
(%) 
Average 
abnormal  
return (%) 
 
All banks 71 0.383 0.603***  6.335 4.224***  3.839 4.427*** 
[t-value]   [2.237]   [6.354]   [4.658] 
G-SIBs 23 2.103 1.355***  9.647 6.319***  8.982 7.714*** 
[t-value]   [3.570]   [6.017]   [5.287] 
Non-G-SIBs 48 -0.441 0.232  4.748 3.250***  1.374 2.875** 
[t-value]   [0.672]   [3.989]   [2.442] 
G-SIBs versus 
non-G-SIBs 
  1.123   3.069   4.839 
[t-value]   [1.991]*   [2.217]**   [2.444]** 
[Z-score]   [1.775]*   [2.328]**   [2.402]** 
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Table 3.2: CDS event study results 
This table shows the CDS event study results from the SUR analyses using a 120 day estimation period for 
the 71 sample banks. The sample banks are further divided into G-SIBs and non-G-SIBs. The average spread 
change refers to the unadjusted spread change, while the average abnormal spread change refers to the 
abnormal spread changes estimated using the SUR analyses. The spread changes are given in bps and the 
values for the event day [0; 0] and the [−2; +2] and [−5; +5] event window are shown. Average abnormal 
spread changes are tested for equality to zero and the associated t-values are given in brackets. The equality 
of means and medians between the two samples are tested for statistical significance using the two sample t-
test and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test. The associated t-values and Z-scores are given in brackets. ***, **, * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Figure 3.1 graphically illustrates the stock as well as CDS market reaction surrounding 
the results of the 2016 U.S. presidential election using unadjusted stock returns (Figure 
3.1 Panel A) and CDS spread changes (Figure 3.1 Panel B). The stock market reaction of 
the banks is initially very positive, particularly for the sample of G-SIBs. Non-G-SIBs, on 
the other hand, show a more subdued equity market reaction, which quickly stabilizes 
following the announcement of the election results. The banks’ CDS spreads, in contrast, 
remained comparatively stable prior to the announcement of the election result. 
Following the announcement, however, CDS spreads widened. This widening is 
particularly pronounced for non-G-SIBs, while the CDS spreads of G-SIBs remained 
comparatively resistant. Overall, this indicates that market participants appear to believe 
that particularly G-SIBs stand to gain from changes in the regulation of financial 
institutions, while smaller institutions may be less affected overall. 
 
 
 
 
 
  Event day [0; 0]  Event window [−2; +2]  Event window 
[−5; +5] 
 n 
Average 
spread 
change 
(bps) 
Average 
abnormal 
spread 
change 
(bps) 
 
Average 
spread 
change 
(bps) 
Average 
abnormal 
spread 
change 
(bps) 
 
Average 
spread 
change 
(bps) 
Average 
abnormal 
spread 
change 
(bps) 
 
All banks 71 1.282 1.418***  1.923 2.508***  3.610 4.897*** 
[t-value]   [5.091]   [2.825]   [4.688] 
G-SIBs 23 0.841 0.922*  −1.209 −0.804  0.179 1.069 
[t-value]   [1.979]   [−0.556]   [0.527] 
Non-G-SIBs 48 1.493 1.656***  3.423 4.094***  5.254 6.732*** 
[t-value]   [4.811]   [3.902]   [5.996] 
G-SIBs versus 
non-G-SIBs 
  −0.734   −4.898   −5.662 
[t-value]   [−1.238]   [−2.696]***   [−2.643]** 
[Z-score]   [−0.805]   [−2.697]***   [−2.660]*** 
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Figure 3.1: Stock and CDS market reaction to the 2016 U.S. presidential election result 
Panel A: Stock market reaction to the 2016 
U.S. presidential election results 
Panel B: CDS market reaction to the 2016 
U.S. presidential election results 
  
This figure shows the sample banks’ stock and CDS market reaction to the announcement of Donald Trump 
winning the 2016 U.S. presidential election in the night from November 8 to November 9, 2016. The graphs 
show the cumulative average unadjusted stock price reaction (Panel A) and the cumulative average 
unadjusted CDS spread reaction (Panel B), starting 5 trading days prior to and ending 5 trading days 
following the announcements of the results of the  2016 U.S. presidential election. 
 
To further investigate the drivers of the observed abnormal stock returns and abnormal 
CDS spread changes, we conduct several OLS regressions. The regression for the average 
abnormal stock returns takes the following form: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝐺‐ 𝑆𝐼𝐵𝑖 + 𝐼𝐵𝑖 + 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑖 + 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 (3.3) 
And for the average abnormal spread changes the following form: 
𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑖 = 𝐺‐ 𝑆𝐼𝐵𝑖 + 𝐼𝐵𝑖 + 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑖 + 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖 + 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑈𝐼𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 (3.4) 
The dependent variable CARi and CASCi are the average abnormal stock returns and 
average abnormal spread changes for firm i on the event day [0;0] and during the 
[−2;+2] and [−5;+5] day event windows, respectively. The independent variables are 
G-SIB, a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the bank is a G-SIB according to the 
Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2015 
list,19 IB is a dummy variable which is defined as 1 if the bank is identified as an 
investment bank (SIC code 6211) and 0 otherwise, VOLA is the stock return volatility 
during the [−126;−6] estimation window, LEVERAGE is the total debt to total assets ratio 
                                                 
19 See http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/2015-update-of-list-of-global-systemically-important-banks-
G-SIBs.pdf for the full list of G-SIBs. 
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of the bank at the end of 2015, and LIQUIDITY is the ratio of non-zero daily CDS spread 
changes to the total number of trading days during the 120-day estimation period. 
Table 3.3 presents the results of the regression analyses. For stocks, the coefficient for the 
variable G-SIB is significant and positive, particularly when using the CAR for of the 
[−5;+5] day event window as the dependent variable. Moreover, stockholders of 
investment banks appear to gain more, as the significant and positive coefficient of IB 
suggests. Lower levels of regulation appear to be perceived as particularly beneficial for 
these institutions. In addition, the stockholders of more highly leveraged banks also 
appear to gain, as the significant coefficient for LEVERAGE documents, while the stock 
volatility does not have an influence. For CDS spreads, the coefficient for G-SIB is likewise 
significant when using the [−2;+2] and [−5;+5] event window spread changes as the 
dependent variables. The negative sign suggests that not only stockholders of the closely 
regulated G-SIBs appear to gain from anticipated lower levels of regulation, but also 
debtholders. The coefficient for the variable LIQUIDITY is highly significant and negative, 
indicating that higher levels of liquidity are associated with lower spread changes. The 
remaining variables have no significant influence on the observed spread changes. 
Table 3.3: Regression results 
 Stocks  CDS 
Event window [0; 0] [−2; +2] [−5; +5]  [0; 0] [−2; +2] [−5; +5] 
G-SIB 0.007 0.005* 0.003**  −0.658 −4.870*** −5.227** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.002)  (0.551) (1.838) (2.112) 
IB 0.019 0.009*** 0.004**  −0.600 −2.709 −2.310 
 (0.013) (0.003) (0.002)  (1.502) (2.383) (2.069) 
VOLA 0.022 0.261 0.032  5.495 74.937 124.477 
 (0.227) (0.162) (0.108)  (30.364) (104.073) (110.316) 
LEVERAGE 0.003*** 0.001** 0.001**  −0.114 −0.054 −0.520 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)  (0.085) (0.444) (0.366) 
LIQUIDITY     −5.241*** −15.597*** −23.880*** 
     (1.985) (5.776) (6.412) 
CONSTANT −0.012* −0.006 −0.002  2.881*** 5.275 10.100*** 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.002)  (1.092) (3.951) (3.597) 
Adj. R2 0.114 0.156 0.101  0.068 0.161 0.267 
F-value 4.13*** 6.41*** 4.40***  1.93 4.26*** 8.44*** 
N 71 71 71  71 71 71 
This table shows the results of the OLS regressions, using firm i’s cumulative abnormal stock return and 
abnormal CDS spread change of the event day [0;0] and the [−2; +2] and [−5; +5] event windows as the 
dependent variable. G-SIB is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the bank is a G-SIB according to 
the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2015 list, IB is a dummy 
variable, which is defined as 1 if the bank is identified as an investment bank (SIC code 6211) and 0 otherwise, 
VOLA is the stock return volatility during the [−126;−6] estimation window, LEVERAGE is the total debt to 
total assets of the bank at the end of the year 2015, and LIQUIDITY is the ratio of non-zero daily CDS spread 
changes to the total number of trading days in the 120 day estimation period. The standard errors are 
corrected for heteroskedasticity and given in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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3.4 Conclusion 
Our empirical analyses show that the announcement of Donald Trump’s victory in the 
2016 U.S. presidential election in the night from November 8 to November 9, 2016, led 
to significant movements in banks’ stock prices and CDS spreads. Overall, stock prices 
increased in the wake of the election announcement, while CDS spreads widened. This is 
potentially due to an anticipated deregulation of financial institutions during the Trump 
presidency, which may allow banks to again increase their exposure to more risky 
business activities, such as proprietary trading. Moreover, our results show that the 
stockholders of G-SIBs gained more than stockholders of non-G-SIBs, while CDS spreads 
only widened for non-G-SIBs. For the closely regulated G-SIBs, the possibility of lower 
levels of regulation in the future is seen as beneficial to equity and credit market 
participants alike. For non-G-SIBs, on the other hand, concerns that these banks may shift 
into riskier businesses, which potentially benefits stockholders more than debtholders, 
appear to be more prevalent. 
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4 Auto ABS since the financial crisis: A comparison 
between the European and U.S. market20 
 
Abstract 
We empirically analyze auto ABS in Europe and the U.S. since the financial crisis. We find 
that both markets have recovered, but the number of retained tranches in Europe is high 
and especially the European market is still relatively intransparent. By analyzing primary 
market spreads, we further investigate which credit and liquidity factors investors take 
into account when making investment decisions. We conclude that for the European as 
well as U.S. market type of originator, nature of collateral, weighted average life of the 
securitization and issuance amount are important variables for investors. Credit ratings 
only play a major role for the U.S. market, but for the European market the picture is not 
as clear – especially the subordinated, often retained tranches do not necessarily show a 
higher spread. This suggests that the European market depends not only on investors, but 
to a large extent ECB funding, as well, and has not shown the recovery the U.S. market 
experienced. 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Securitizations and their influence on capital market disruptions have been widely 
discussed since the recent financial crisis. Especially the growth of mortgage-backed 
securities together with the boom of the housing market were the focus of criticism. With 
“originate-to-distribute21” products capital markets had decoupled from the real economy. 
In the wake of the financial crisis many investors, especially in Europe, withdrew from 
investing in securitizations across asset classes. This is particularly surprising as default 
rates of mortgage backed securities were very low in Europe compared to the U.S. In 
Europe, default rates of residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) e.g. never rose 
above 0.1%, whereas in the U.S. AAA-rated RMBS backed by prime mortgages reached a 
                                                 
20 This chapter is based on a working paper, Hachenberg B., Kiesel F., Schiereck D. (2018): Auto ABS since 
the financial crisis: A comparison between the European and U.S. market. 
21 Products were created just to be sold to investors and the due diligence of loans was not as intense, as it 
would have been if kept on balance sheet by the originator. 
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default rate of 3% and defaults of AAA-rated RMBS backed by subprime mortgages even 
peaked at 16% (European Commission 2015). 
In this article, we analyze the European and U.S. auto ABS market following the financial 
crisis, from 2010 to the 1st half of 2017. Auto loan and lease ABS were never seen as the 
cause of the crisis, but suffered from the bad image, that came along with securitizations 
in general. Tighter market regulation has also made it more difficult for various 
institutional investors to buy ABS, as well as issuers to securitize their collateral. Auto 
financing is seen as the key to auto sales though and securitization of automobile loans 
and leases was traditionally the key to its refinancing (Fabozzi and Kothari 2008), thus a 
very close connection between capital markets and the real economy and an effective risk 
transfer. 
We investigate if auto ABS, one of the oldest classes of ABS, are still an important 
instrument to provide funding for issuers and a reliable investment for investors, or if the 
market has not recovered meaningfully since its contraction during the financial crisis. 
We also empirically study the credit factors investors take into account when investing in 
auto ABS. 
In the wake of the crisis various parties call for more transparency on structured products. 
The European Commission e.g. proposed a regulation on simple, transparent and 
standardised (STS) securitizations (European Commission 2015). Organizations like the 
Prime Collateralised Securities (PCS) initiative, set up in 2012, have been established, 
that promote, among others, standards of transparency and simplicity. A further objective 
is to look at the transparency of auto ABS. We compare European and U.S. transactions 
to work out the differences and investigate if the markets are in different cycles. This 
study contributes to the existing literature about structured products and sheds light on 
current auto ABS in Europe and the United States.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of 
the recent literature about securitizations and in particular auto ABS. Section 3 describes 
the data and methodologies we use. Section 4 then outlines descriptive statistics and 
empirical results, and the last section ends the paper with the conclusion. 
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4.2 Literature review and status quo on auto ABS 
4.2.1 Literature review 
Literature about securitizations is manifold. The role of credit rating agencies and credit 
ratings of securitizations, especially during the financial crisis and the boom years leading 
to the crisis, have been intensively discussed. Criticized have been a number of factors, 
leading from the fee model rating agencies followed over the overreliance rating agencies 
enjoyed to the models they used. He et al. (2012) reveal that investors price the risk that 
larger issuers of mortgage-backed securities receive more inflated ratings than smaller 
issuers, particularly during boom periods. The Bank for International Settlements (2008) 
discovers, among others, an overdependence on ratings as well as other weaknesses in 
investors’ risk management. By analyzing collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) Griffin 
and Tang (2012) come to the conclusion that one of the top three rating agencies 
frequently made positive adjustments to their credit rating model that resulted in much 
larger AAA-rated tranches. 
Fabozzi and Vink (2012) look at the variables investors rely upon other than credit ratings 
when investing in ABS and find significance in internal and external credit enhancement, 
commercial ABS and size of tranche. Acharya et al. (2013) analyze asset-backed 
commercial paper (ABCP) conduits as a mean to use securitization without risk transfer 
but regulatory arbitrage instead. Various new regulations have been established after the 
crisis from both, the financial regulatory authorities in the U.S. and European Union. Guo 
and Wu (2014) e.g. study the risk retention regulation on ABS, disclosure on securitized 
assets and informational asymmetries between issuers and investors. Albertazzi et al. 
(2015) analyze whether banks use asymmetric information for their advantage when 
issuing securitizations. They conclude that for their dataset of a million mortgages the 
default probability of securitized mortgages is, for given observable characteristics, lower 
than for the non-securitized mortgages. Looking at securitized loans only, their findings 
are different though. They show that banks maintain a higher share of risk in deals with 
better-quality-loans. A point of discussion are also the pros and cons of a true-sale 
securitization vs. keeping assets on balance sheet (see e.g. Higgins and Mason 2004). 
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Auto ABS are typically true-sale securitizations (i.e. a legal separation of originator and 
issuer of the security, the later a SPV) in both regions, the U.S. as well as in Europe. 
Comparing structured finance markets in the U.S. and Europe (see Table 4.1), we notice 
that the pure volume of the U.S. market is still a multiple of the European market, with 
the difference even increasing since the crisis (AFME 2017). 
Table 4.1: Structured finance issuance in Europe at the U.S. 
This table shows structured finance issuance in Europe and the U.S. in billion Euro from 2010 up to the 1st 
quarter of 2017 (AFME 2017). 
  
European Historical 
Issuance 
U.S. Historical  
Issuance 
2010 378.0 1225.7 
2011 376.8 1052.8 
2012 257.8 1568.5 
2013 180.8 1517.4 
2014 217.0 1443.3 
2015 216.6 1635.4 
2016 238.6 1796.7 
2017 36.7 410.6 
According to the Association for Financial Markets in Europe (AFME), the volume of 
outstanding securitizations at the beginning of 2017 was 1,244 billion Euro in Europe 
and 8,681 billion Euro in the U.S. However, an “outstanding” securitization does not 
necessarily mean it is placed with investors. A recent development in Europe, since 2008, 
is that the issuer retains tranches, or even the full securitization. In many cases the 
European Central Bank (ECB) provides liquidity for banks against those retained tranches. 
The amount of placed vs. retained structures varies for the years and asset classes in 
question and fluctuates roughly in between 30% and 70% for European structures. In the 
U.S. the issuer rarely retains any paper above the 5% risk retention rule, which we will 
discuss in the next chapter. 
The percentage of ABS22 of outstanding securitizations is very similar, around 6% in 
Europa and 7% in the U.S. ABS backed by auto loans and leases belong to consumer 
ABS23. The percentage of auto ABS of total securitizations has grown since the crisis in 
both markets, and their relative importance has risen (see e.g. DZ Bank AG 2017; Mohr 
2015). Figure 4.1 shows the total auto ABS and ABS issuance in Europe and the U.S. since 
2010. 
                                                 
22 European ABS issuance includes auto, credit card, leases, loans, receivables and other; U.S. ABS issuance 
includes auto, credit card, home equity, student loan, equipment leases, manufactured housing and other. 
23 For a more detailed description of consumer ABS see e.g. Fabozzi and Kothari (2008). 
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Figure 4.1: Auto and total ABS issuance in Europe and the U.S. 
This figure shows yearly auto ABS issuance in Europe and the U.S. from 2010 to 2016 (right hand scale) as 
well as total ABS issuance in Europe and the U.S. (left hand scale), all in million U.S. dollars. European figures 
include auto leases, U.S. figures include all types of auto ABS. Source: 
https://www.sifma.org/resources/research/europe-structured-finance-issuance-and-outstanding/ and 
https://www.sifma.org/resources/research/us-abs-issuance-and-outstanding/. 
 
 
Looking at auto transactions in Europe and the U.S., the first obvious distinction is that 
in Europe usually the collateral of auto ABS is considered prime collateral. In the U.S. on 
the contrary apart from prime loan collateral also subprime or near-prime collateral is 
securitized. The concept of the FICO24 score, which does not exist in its form in Europe, 
helps to distinguish the collateral in the U.S. into three classes. The weighted average 
FICO score of the underlying loans of prime securitizations is more than 680, near-prime 
transactions have a FICO score between 620 and 680, and subprime transactions below 
620 (see e.g. Lancaster et al. 2008). Looking at the age of the vehicle, prime auto ABS 
securitize loans of new vehicles, whereas subprime transactions can consist of used cars, 
as well (see e.g. Fabozzi and Kothari 2008). 
Subprime auto loans have recently been the focus of criticism, warning about relaxing 
underwriting standards and rising loss severities (Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency 2016; Curry 2015). But also prime U.S. auto securitizations are experiencing 
                                                 
24 FICO is a credit score developed by the company FICO, whose original name was Fair Isaac Corporation. 
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weaker underwriting trends (longer original loan terms as well as slightly lower FICO 
scores) and thus an increase in cumulative loss rates (Moody's Investor Service 2017). 
U.S. auto ABS are not only classified by collateral quality, but the collateral is also further 
categorized into fleet, floorplan, motorcycle, rental and recreational vehicle (RV) 
transactions (see e.g. Fabozzi 2000). The securitization of auto lease cash flows exists in 
both jurisdictions, the U.S. as well as Europe, as a separate asset class. In Europe, loan 
and lease originators are typically banks or captives (auto manufacturer finance 
subsidiaries), in the U.S., on the other hand, there are also a number of Specialty Finance 
Companies which originate auto loans (Sze and Shah 2017). 
4.2.2 Status quo 
Both, issuers as well as investors, benefit from securitization. Securitization offers issuers 
an additional funding source. The issuance of auto ABS is, among others, dependent on 
the general macro-financial framework, private consumer spending and, more 
importantly, automobile sales. U.S. and European automobile sales are at or near their 
recent highs (see Figure 4.2). 
Figure 4.2: Vehicle sales in Europe and the U.S. 
This figure shows monthly vehicle sales (new vehicle registrations in Europe; sales of autos and light trucks, 
not seasonally adjusted, in the U.S.) from 2010 to June 2017, sales are in thousands. Source: European 
Automobile Manufacturers Association; Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
 
The investor benefits from an investment that can be tailor-made to his risk appetite and 
investment horizon. For investors the credit rating of their investment and the credit 
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rating migration throughout the life of the transaction are very important. Analyzing 
rating migration for auto securitizations, it becomes obvious, that auto ABS receive more 
upgrades than downgrades. This is the case for the following reasons: Over the relatively 
short life of the auto transactions, their credit enhancement increases. Credit 
enhancement increases as a consequence of non-declining reserve accounts, the 
availability of excess spread to turbo notes and trapping excess spread within the ABS 
transaction (Sze and Shah 2017). The ratio of upgrades vs. downgrades is even better for 
auto transactions compared to other structured finance instruments. Looking at the 
combined ratio of upgrades vs. downgrades of auto ABS securitizations for credit rating 
agencies DBRS, Fitch Ratings, Moody’s Investor Services and S&P in Europe (Table 4.2), 
it is 79/0 for 2016 and 23/0 for the 1st quarter of 2017 (AFME 2017). On the contrary, 
AFME reports for securitizations overall a ratio of upgrades vs. downgrades of 2,094/424 
for 2016 and 471/182 for the 1st quarter of 2017. In the U.S. the picture is similar. The 
ratio of upgrades vs. downgrades for auto securitizations is 697/0 for DBRS, Fitch Ratings, 
Moody’s Investor Services and S&P for 2016 and 136/0 for the same rating agencies for 
the 1st quarter of 2017. Again securitizations overall have a significantly worse ratio of 
13,784/5,632 for 2016 and 2,367/1,117 for the 1st quarter of 2017. 
Table 4.2: Credit rating migration in Europe and the U.S. 
This table shows the ratio of upgrades/downgrades of the four credit rating agencies DBRS, Fitch Ratings, 
Moody’s Investor Services and S&P. Data for 2016 is the full year, for 2017 1st quarter (AFME 2017). 
    Europe U.S. 
2016 Auto securitizations 79/0  697/0  
  All securitizations 2,094/424 13,784/5,632  
2017 Auto securitizations 23/0  136/0  
  All securitizations 471/182  2,367/1,117  
Looking at the pricing of primary securitizations and secondary levels, a dependence in 
both markets, the European as well as the U.S. market, has been achieved through the 
support of the ECB and Federal Reserve Bank. The ECB started buying, among others, 
auto ABS through its Asset-Backed Securities Purchase Programme (ABSPP) in November 
2014. Up to the end of June 2017 the ECB bought ABS in the amount of around 24.1 
billion Euro25. Eligible are the most senior tranches of ABS or guaranteed mezzanine 
                                                 
25 The history of cumulative purchase breakdowns of the asset purchase programme is published at 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/omt/html/index.en.html. 
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tranches (European Central Bank 2014). As auto ABS are typically not guaranteed, the 
ECB buys their senior tranches only. The Federal Reserve Bank allows through its program 
Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) since November 2008 the refinancing 
of, among others, ABS backed by auto loans. Thus borrowers receive lower margins than 
otherwise achievable (see e.g. Gârleanu and Pedersen 2011). 
 4.3 Sample construction and methodology 
As subprime and near-prime auto transactions only exist as a classification in the U.S. and 
not throughout Europe, we concentrate on prime and lease transactions only. 
For the European transactions, we use data from the internal data base of a large 
European bank and supplement missing components through Thomson Reuters, Global 
Capital and the weekly publication “Global ABS/CDO Weekly Market Snapshot” 
published by J.P. Morgan. Our goal is to look at the development of auto ABS after the 
financial crisis, thus we filter for auto ABS transactions from the beginning of January 
2010 to the end of June 2017. The database includes 324 transactions with a total of 703 
tranches for the time span. We take a closer look at the largest 100 transactions (loans 
and leases). We define largest transactions by looking at the original notional across 
tranches. Non-Euro currencies, like the pound sterling, Norwegian krone, U.S. dollar, 
Polish zloty, Australian dollar and Swedish krona we recalculate into Euro at their 
respective exchange rate at date of issuance of the auto ABS. Two of the largest 100 
transactions are private placements without any further details like yield, credit rating 
etc., thus we exclude them and include the next two largest transactions. The remaining 
sample of 100 European auto transactions consists of 247 tranches. The total volume of 
the 100 largest transactions is 973.51 billion Euro original amount at issuance, thus on 
average less than one billion Euro per transaction. Taking into account the head 
institutions only, the transactions are originated by 12 different companies. 
For the U.S. data we use the weekly publication “Global ABS/CDO Weekly Market 
Snapshot” published by J.P. Morgan and supplement missing data again, were applicable, 
through Thomson Reuters and Global Capital. As a first step, we collect all prime auto 
loan and lease transactions from January 2010 to the end of June 2017. To obtain a good 
comparison of similar transactions in Europe and the U.S., we analyze securitizations 
collateralized by prime auto loans and leases only and leave out U.S. subprime, fleet, 
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floorplan and motorcycle/truck securitizations. Looking at the 100 largest transactions, 
the cut off is 1.250 billion U.S. dollars original amount at issuance. All U.S. transactions 
are issued in U.S. dollars. Since 19 transactions have the same issue amount, we include 
the transactions issued first until our sample includes 100 deals. Figure 4.3 shows the 
timeline of issuance of our 100 largest European and U.S. auto ABS securitizations. 
Figure 4.3: Auto ABS in Europe and the U.S. between 2010 and the 1st half of 2017 
This figure shows quarterly issuance (in millions) of the 100 largest European and U.S. auto ABS from 2010 
to the 1st half of 2017. For European transactions, issuance amount is the original notional across tranches 
for each transaction, recalculated at date of issuance into Euro for non-Euro currencies. U.S. auto ABS are 
shown in U.S. dollars. 
 
The 100 largest auto ABS transactions in the U.S. consist of 534 different tranches, thus 
structurally it is already obvious that compared to Europe, with a mean of less than 2.5 
tranches per transaction, U.S. deals are more complex. With a variety of different tranches 
they are more tailor-made to the specific needs of the investors. In terms of number of 
issuers, our U.S. sample is also more heterogeneous, since the 100 transactions are 
originated by 15 different institutions. 
As a next step, we look at issuance spreads of European and U.S. auto transaction, to 
extract variables investors consider when buying a transaction. Secondary market spreads 
in ABS are still existent, but as the secondary market in ABS is not very liquid, prices may 
not be sufficiently reliable as a basis for analysis (Fabozzi and Vink 2012). Markit e.g. is 
one of the largest providers of secondary quotes of auto ABS transactions in Europe. 
Quotes are obtained from up to 16 dealers, but even AAA-rated auto loan ABS are not 
quoted every day. Single A-rated auto loan ABS are missing a large number of quotes and 
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for lower rated tranches it is even more difficult to receive daily prices. Figure 4.1 shows 
secondary prices for European auto ABS from 2010 to 2016. 
Figure 4.4: Secondary auto ABS spreads in Europe 
This figure shows secondary spreads of floating rate auto loan ABS in Europe, in bps above the respective 
benchmark from January 2010 to the 1st half of 2017. Source: Markit. 
 
In the U.S. ABS secondary prices are available on TRACE26 now, so going forward it will 
be easier to analyze U.S. secondary markets. 
Since our ABS portfolios consist of floating and fixed rate ABS tranches issued in various 
currencies, spreads are noted above different benchmarks, mid swaps, Euribor, Libor, etc. 
To obtain a meaningful comparison, we use the spread in bps above the respective 
benchmark only and not the overall yield of the transaction. 
Important factors to consider for investors when looking at an investment and justifying 
if the spread they receive is fair, are: (1) credit risk, (2) liquidity risk and (3) optionality 
risk (Fabozzi and Mann 2010). Since prepayments27 are remarkably stable and 
independent from the level of interest rates for auto loans, we can neglect the optionality 
risk and will concentrate on (1) credit risk and (2) liquidity risk in this analysis. 
We analyze securitizations with prime auto loans and leases as collateral, thus the 
underlying credit risk is relatively homogenous. All transactions are issued by SPVs. The 
                                                 
26 TRACE is FINRA’s Corporate and Agency Bond Price Dissemination Service that reports OTC secondary 
market transactions in eligible fixed income securities.  
27 For a more detailed discussion on prepayments for auto loans and leases see e.g. McPherson (2000). 
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originator of the collateral can be a captive (i.e. a finance subsidiary of an auto 
manufacturer), a bank or a specialty finance company. 
Structurally, securitizations from captives may differ from securitizations issued by banks. 
Captives may promote vehicle sales by offering a low or even zero percent annualized 
percentage rate (APR) to borrowers. To avoid negative excess spread in the transaction, 
a yield supplement in the pool may need to be created, e.g. by holding a cash reserve or 
overcollateralization of the pool (Fabozzi and Kothari 2008). To analyze whether 
transactions whose underlying collateral is originated by captives, price differently than 
transactions from banks or specialty finance companies, we use the dummy variable 
captives. For an overview of the variables we use throughout this paper see Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3: Overview of variables 
Variable Description 
Auto ABS Spread 
 
Spread at date of issuance of the respective auto ABS paper, noted in bps above its 
benchmark. 
Captive Dummy variable, which takes value 1 if the originator of the loans/leases is a captive, 
0 otherwise. 
Loan Dummy variable, which takes value 1 if the underlying is an auto loan (prime in the 
U.S., all auto loans in Europe), 0 otherwise. 
WAL Original weighted average life of the transaction in years at issuance. 
logAmount Logarithmized original amount at issuance, in U.S. dollars for U.S. transaction; in Euro 
for European transactions, local currencies recalculated using the exchange rate at date 
of issuance. 
Controls Dummy variables for each quarter, from quarter 1 to 30; each of these equals one if 
the securitization was completed during the corresponding quarter, 0 otherwise. 
Credit Rating Dummy variable for each rating class from AAA to CC, which takes value 1 if the credit 
rating has the respective rating class, 0 otherwise. 
Rating Numeric Recalculated credit rating using a numerical 17 grade scale. 
ECB Dummy variable that takes value 0 if date of issuance was on or before 31st of October 
2014, 1 if date of issuance was thereafter. 
We also want to investigate whether it is important for investors when looking at the 
credit risk of a transaction to consider the type of the underlying collateral. Our European 
and U.S. portfolios include securitizations with auto loans as well as auto leases as 
collateral. Auto leases differ from auto loans in many ways. One important factor to 
consider is residual risk28, i.e. the risk of the residual value of the car at the end of the 
lease term, a risk often borne within the structure of the securitization. We would expect 
investors to demand higher spreads for ABS with auto leases as underlying compared to 
                                                 
28 For a comprehensive description of handling residual value risk in auto securitizations see e.g. McPherson 
(2000). 
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auto loans. To account for auto loans and leases, we introduce the dummy variable prime 
loans. 
Looking at our second spread component, (2) liquidity risk, we use a variable for the 
weighted average life (WAL) of the transaction, WAL. We also create a variable amount. 
Amount is the logarithmized original notional of a tranche at issuance. Provided a tranche 
from the European portfolio is not issued in Euro, we recalculate the original notional at 
issuance into Euro using the exchange rate at date of issuance. Since a longer WAL binds 
investors’ capital for a longer term, we expect spreads to be wider for tranches with longer 
maturities. Larger amounts at issuance should lead to better liquidity in the secondary 
market thus we expect tighter spreads for tranches with larger original issue amounts, all 
else being equal. 
We analyze the impact of our variables on spread at issuance using OLS regressions, 
corrected for heteroscedasticity (White 1980). 
Our first model (4.1) is defined as 
𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜 𝐴𝐵𝑆 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑊𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the idiosyncratic error term. For a more detailed description of the regression 
variables we use see Table 4.3. 
In our second model we want to control for macroeconomic conditions at time of issuance 
of the securitizations. Thus we follow (Fabozzi and Vink 2012) and use time control 
variables for each quarter. 
Our second model (4.2) is defined as 
𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜 𝐴𝐵𝑆 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡
=  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑊𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡
+ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
One of the characteristics of an ABS is tranching the underlying pool, to receive securities 
for various risk appetites29. The credit rating of a tranche reflects the credit risk of that 
tranche. In our third regression model we account for credit ratings and create dummies 
for all rating categories. According to previous literature (Norden and Weber 2004; 
                                                 
29 For a more detailed explanation on tranching securities see e.g. Fabozzi and Mann (2012). 
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Friewald et al. 2012; Kiesel and Schiereck 2015) we recalculate the original ratings at 
new issuance of our two portfolios using a numerical 17 grade scale (Aaa/AAA=1, 
Aa1/AA+=2,.., Caa1/CCC and below =17). The securitizations are rated by Moody’s 
Investor Services, S&P and Fitch Ratings. A number of tranches are rated by two or even 
all three credit rating agencies. For our calculations we use the lowest of the ratings 
available. We have to bear in mind though, that the difference between credit ratings 
from various rating agencies can be large, in some cases in our portfolios it is three 
notches, which may hinder the accuracy of the results. The mean rating of our European 
portfolio is 3.3711. Descriptive statistics of the portfolio can be found in Table 4.4. 
A large number of the European tranches, 115 out of 247, were retained by the issuing 
institutions and not marketed externally. Out of these retained tranches 51 tranches do 
not have a credit rating. The European Commission proposed two legislative measures, a 
regulation on securitization that includes, among others, risk retention rules, but also a 
set of criteria to identify STS securitizations and amendments to the capital treatment of 
securitizations. The risk retention rules (Article 405 of the Capital Requirements 
Regulation, Article 51 of the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Regulation and 
Article 254 of the Solvency II Delegated Act) require institutions bound by those 
provisions to only invest in securitizations if, among others, the originator, sponsor or 
original lender has explicitly disclosed, that he is retaining a material net economic 
interest of at least 5% of the securitization. For auto ABS these are usually the 
subordinated tranches. In total, there are 53 tranches without a credit rating, 51 retained, 
2 publicly marketed. All tranches without a rating are subordinated tranches. Looking at 
the total volume of retained tranches, which is 280.42 billion Euro original amount at 
issuance, we see that this is nearly 29% of our total portfolio thus significantly higher 
than the 5% risk retention rule that is required. In many cases banks use retained tranches 
for ECB collateral against which the ECB provides funding to them. In addition to the 
retained tranches, a volume of 158.74 billion Euro, thus more than 16%, was privately 
placed, leaving us with only around 55% publicly marketed. 
In the U.S. similar provisions to the risk retention rules that were described earlier exist 
under Section 941 of the Dodd-Frank Act that came into effect in 2010. Under certain 
conditions securitizations of qualifying U.S. auto loans (not leases) can be exempt from 
these rules though. Contrary to Europe, the percentage of retained paper in the United 
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States is hardly ever higher than 5%. Furthermore, amongst the 522 U.S. tranches are 
only two tranches without a credit rating. 
Our third and final model (4.3), including credit ratings, is defined as follows: 
𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜 𝐴𝐵𝑆 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡
=  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑊𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5−23𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
4.4 Empirical results 
4.4.1 Descriptive results 
Table 4.4 shows descriptive statistics of the 100 largest European and U.S. prime auto 
loan and lease securitizations issued between 2010 and the 1st half of 2017. 
Table 4.4: Descriptive statistics 
This table shows descriptive statistics of the 100 largest auto ABS transactions in Europe and the U.S. issued 
between 2010 and the 1st half of 2017. Transaction mean amount is shown in Euro for European transactions 
(non-Euro currencies are recalculated into Euro with their respective exchange rate at date of issuance), in 
U.S. dollars for U.S. transactions. WAL is shown in years, mean rating is calculated using a numerical 17 
grade scale (Aaa/AAA=1, Aa1/AA+=2,.., Caa1/CCC and below =17). 
  Europe U.S.  
Tranches 247 522 
Transaction mean amount 973.51 1479.59 
Issuer 12 15 
WAL 3.01 2.11 
mean credit rating 3.37 1.92 
highest credit rating Aaa/AAA Aaa/AAA 
lowest credit rating CC Baa3/BBB 
yield at issuance 1.75 1.17 
spread 77.88 39.75 
Fixed rate tranches 90 413 
Floating rate tranches 137 66 
Loans (% of tranches) 83 81 
Captives (% of tranches) 67 89 
 
The lowest credit rating of our European portfolio is 17 which corresponds to CC. The 
lowest rating of our U.S. portfolio on the other hand is 10, which corresponds in this case 
to Baa3/BBB, thus still investment grade. The weighted average credit ratings of our 
portfolios are showing the same picture. The European sample with a weighted average 
rating of 3.37, corresponding to approximately Aa2/AA, is lower than the weighted 
average rating of our U.S. sample with 1.92, which is slightly better than a rating of 
Aa1/AA+. As in Europe no distinction between prime, near-prime and subprime collateral 
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exists, but all auto ABS transactions are considered prime, it is not surprising that a 
portfolio with the highest auto ABS class in the U.S. has a slightly higher mean rating 
than a European portfolio. The difference between both portfolios (about one notch) is 
relatively small though and both mean ratings are on the high end compared to other 
asset classes. 
The WAL of the European transactions is longer and the average notional at issuance is 
smaller than their U.S. peers’. All else being equal, investors face higher risk through the 
longer maturity as well as lower liquidity of the European portfolio (see e.g. Fabozzi and 
Mann 2010). Thus as expected the average yield at issuance as well as spread (in bps 
above the respective benchmark) is higher for the European portfolio. 
The number of different issuers is larger in the U.S. than in Europe. U.S. auto ABS did 
face criticism recently, that many specialty finance companies with lower underwriting 
criteria would enter the market (Börsen-Zeitung 2017). At least for our sample of the 
largest 100 prime loan and lease transactions we cannot find evidence for this. Our 
sample includes just two specialty finance companies which are both in the market for 
decades already. 
The underlying loans and leases usually have a fixed interest rate. Traditionally in Europe 
securitizations are swapped and tranches are issued for investors in floating rate format, 
since the buyer base, especially banks, has a preference for floating rate issues. Looking 
at the 90 fixed rate tranches in Europe it becomes obvious that none of the 90 tranches 
was publicly marketed and most were retained by the issuer. An explanation might be 
that for the retained tranches the issuers avoid the costs of swapping the deal (S&P Global 
Ratings 2017). The U.S. market on the other hand is dominated by fixed rate tranches, 
since the demand of the buyer base (pension funds’, insurance companies’ et al.) is mainly 
for fixed rate tranches. 
4.4.2 Regression results 
The results of our regression models are shown in Table 4.530. Our dependent variable 
Auto ABS Spread is affected by all independent variables in the U.S. portfolio, most of 
                                                 
30 All models are controlled for heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity.  
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them are highly significant. The European data shows significance for all variables apart 
from prime loans. 
Table 4.5: Regression results 
This table shows regression results of our first, second and third model. A detailed description of the variables 
used is available in Table 4.3. The tables show the coefficients and t-statistics, corrected for heteroscedasticity, 
in parentheses. The “-“ sign denotes not included, the basis category are AAA tranches and European tranches 
rated below BBB-/Baa3 are omitted. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  
  Europe U.S. Europe U.S. Europe U.S. 
Captive -30.6376*** -11.32681* -28.02115** -9.74374* -33.9825*** -8.222976* 
  (-3.70) (-2.44) (-3.52) (-1.72) (-3.64) (-2.80) 
Prime loan -12.65661 -21.40109*** -9.293106 -25.00043*** -19.02218* -25.8049*** 
  (-1.46) (-3.83) (-1.13) (-3.96) (-2.10) (-4.98) 
WAL 15.06753** 8.369741*** 11.6452** 10.46295*** 16.79162** 9.997957*** 
  (3.54) (3.82) (2.93) (5.72) (3.76) (8.73) 
Size of tranche -13.23686*** -20.45539*** -14.09801*** -20.493138*** -00.51282 7.55402** 
  (-4.78) (-7.11) (-5.99) (-7.37) (-2.81) (-3.22) 
Quarter 
dummies no no yes yes yes yes 
          
AA+/Aa1 - - - - 9.623537 44.10019*** 
        (0.45) (4.32) 
AA/Aa2 - - - - 35.60921* 52.22448*** 
        (2.24) (4.68) 
AA-/Aa3 - - - - 21.26183 49.34165*** 
        (0.90) (5.45) 
A+/A1 - - - - 34.43796** 87.97634*** 
        (3.03) (5.67) 
A/A2 - - - - -7.803067 86.19147*** 
        (-0.45) (5.69) 
A-/A3 - - - - omitted 78.76629*** 
         (8.21) 
BBB+/Baa1 - - - - omitted 174.9913*** 
         (18.04) 
BBB/Baa2 - - - - 69.34259 144.3161*** 
        (1.76) (9.94) 
BBB-/Baa3 - - - - omitted 154.3505*** 
            -9.52 
adjusted R2 0.3569 0.4286 0.5936 0.4766 0.4730 0.7504 
F-test 18.76 96.04 7.23 24.31 4.48 75.55 
Number of 
observations 129 449 129 449 129 449 
 
The sign of the coefficient is for all variables in Europe and the U.S. the same and as 
expected. For an investor it is an important credit factor to know, if auto loans and leases 
are originated by captives or banks/specialty finance companies. The coefficient for 
captives is higher and more significant in Europe than in the U.S. An explanation may be, 
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that a large number of the tranches of our European portfolio are originated by banks 
from the so called “PIIGS” countries (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain) which 
suffered from wider spreads in the wake of the financial crisis. None of the European 
captives on the other hand has their origin in the PIIGS countries. The same explanation 
may hold true for the variable prime loans in our European portfolio which is, in contrast 
to the U.S. portfolio, not significant. Looking at the auto leases which are included, we 
notify that none of the originators is headquartered in a PIIGS country, in contrary to the 
originators of our prime auto loans. 
In our second model, we use exactly the same variables as in the first model, but control 
for macroeconomic conditions through time variables. We use quarter dummies for both 
portfolios31 (not shown in the results table). Our U.S. as well as European portfolio show 
the same results. Almost all variables are highly significant, the coefficients are showing 
the same expected signs and the explanatory power of the model is significantly higher. 
This underlines our previous results and reveals that all variables matter for investors. 
In our third model we use the same variables as before but also include credit rating 
dummies, for the European portfolio from Aaa/AAA to CC, for the U.S. portfolio from 
Aaa/AAA to Baa3/BBB. Looking at the U.S. portfolio, all variables apart from amount, 
which is less significant in model 332, have the same level of significance. All included 
credit rating dummies are highly significant and the explanatory power of the model is 
much higher. 
The picture of the European portfolio is different though. Most credit rating dummies for 
lower ratings are omitted and hardly any variable is significant, no variable is highly 
significant. The coefficients seem to be in “disorder” as well, i.e. not a clear sign that 
investors are compensated for a lower credit rating through a higher spread. Figure 4.5 
shows a plot of our rating and spread results. 
 
 
 
                                                 
31 Quarter 29 is not existent for the European portfolio as no transactions were issued during that time frame, 
quarter 8 and 23 are omitted; for the U.S. portfolio quarter 9 is omitted. 
32 Variable amount shows the same behavior as experienced by Fabozzi and Vink (2012), which can be 
explained by the high correlation between credit rating and amount (the higher the rating the larger the 
tranche size typically for ABS). 
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Figure 4.5: Spreads and ratings distribution of European auto ABS 
This figure shows spreads and ratings of our European auto ABS portfolio. Spreads are shown in bps above 
the respective benchmark at date of issuance of the transaction. 
 
Tranches without public spread at new issuance (109 tranches) are not shown in Figure 
4.5 and not rated tranches (53 tranches) are only shown when a spread at new issuance 
is available. Although our figure can demonstrate only limited information, it already 
becomes obvious that a higher credit spread compensating for a lower credit rating is not 
necessarily visible. 
An explanation might be the high number of retained tranches in Europe, especially 
subordinated, i.e. lower rated (or not rated) tranches. As those tranches are not marketed 
publicly in many cases no spread at new issuance of the transaction is available, or even 
if it is available it may not be a spread a rational investor would be willing to buy the 
tranche at. Thus we conclude that for the European auto ABS market it is much more 
difficult to obtain a transparent picture and the market does not seem to have fully 
recovered since the crisis. 
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4.4.3. Robustness of the results and further analyses 
We test our results using the third model, but substitute the various credit rating dummies 
through one single variable called rating numeric. This variable is calculated using the 
numerical 17 grade scale described earlier. Our results are the same as before. For our 
U.S. portfolio the same variables are significant, including our new variable rating 
numeric. On the contrary the European portfolio does not show significance for the new 
variable rating numeric. 
As a next step we want to test a possible influence of ABSPP to our dependent variable 
Auto ABS Spread for the European portfolio. As the ECB starting buying auto ABS in 
November 2014, we use a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the issuance of the 
auto ABS was on or after November 1st 2014, value 0 if the issuance did take place before 
that date. The results show significance for variable ECB in the first model, all other 
variables do not change. If we include our control variables (the second model), ECB does 
not show any significance any more, which leads to the impression that significance of 
the variable ECB was not necessarily due to the ECB buying ABS, but rather general 
macroeconomic conditions. 
4.5 Conclusion 
We examine the European and U.S. auto ABS market following the financial crisis, from 
2010 to the 1st half of 2017. We look at prime auto loans and leases in both markets. Our 
findings suggest that the auto ABS market still plays an important role in the capital 
markets and particularly to finance the real economy. High asset quality and an ease in 
liquidation of delinquent receivables makes this asset class very appealing. The 
percentage of auto ABS of total ABS has increased since the crisis, even more importantly 
for placed ABS compared to retained tranches. Investors benefit from high ratings and 
hardly any downward rating migration. The market is, despite a push from regulators and 
others, still relatively intransparent. The number of private placements and retained 
transactions and tranches, in excess of the risk retention rule, is high in Europe (45% for 
our portfolio). Thus it is challenging to retain all details necessary to value securitizations. 
This is especially true for subordinated tranches of European auto ABS. In addition no 
binding system like TRACE exists in Europe for ABS which would require market 
participants to publish secondary levels. The U.S. market on the other hand is still more 
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mature than the European market. Volumes of the overall market and the average 
notional of transactions are larger. Structural features take care of specific investor needs, 
with a large number of tranches per transaction designed to account for investor demand. 
The percentage of retained tranches above the 5% risk retention rule is low and markets 
overall are more transparent. 
We further look at auto ABS spreads at issuance of the securitizations, to analyze which 
credit risk and liquidity factors investors consider when investing in auto ABS. We find 
that the following factors are important in our models: The nature of the collateral (auto 
loan or auto lease), the issuer (captive or other), the average life of the transaction as 
well as the original amount at issuance are fundamental factors investors consider for 
European as well as U.S. transactions. Not surprisingly, the credit rating is significant for 
all rating classes, as well. However, the impact of the credit rating only holds for the U.S. 
portfolio, since a large number of the subordinated tranches in Europe is without rating 
and/or retained by the issuer of the transaction. 
We conclude that the U.S. auto ABS market seems to have fully recovered since the 
financial crisis. The European market is important for issuers as well as for investors, but 
to a large extent dependent on funding from the ECB instead of investor demand and thus 
has not recovered fully since the financial crisis.  
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5 The CLO market in Europe: Impact of the risk retention 
rule33 
Abstract 
We empirically analyze CLOs in Europe since the financial crisis. In 2011 the so-called 
“risk retention rule” came into force, originally designed to align interests between issuers 
and investors. We study the implications and effects the risk retention rule had on 
managed cash CLOs (arbitrage deals). We conclude that the market suffered severely 
during the time the rule was introduced, but an alignment of interests does not necessarily 
seem to have been attained. Furthermore, we analyze the implications the form of risk 
retention (vertical or horizontal) has on asset pricing. We find that CLO manager 
experience, credit rating and issuance amount are important factors which influence 
pricing expectations of CLO investors, but the form in which the CLO manager retains the 
risk does not seem to play a role. 
 
5.1 Introduction 
With issuances of 214 billion Euro in 2017 vs. 203 billion Euro in 2007, leveraged loans 
and high yield bonds hit a record high in Europe in 2017, even breaking through the 
heights seen shortly before the financial crisis in 2007 (compare Wade and Millar 2018). 
Likewise 2017 has been a record year for European CLOs with 51 deals coming to the 
market, a total of 20.9 billion Euro (Wade and Millar 2018). This accounts for the 
strongest year for European CLO issuance to date since the financial crisis. 
However, post-crisis CLO volumes are far from the levels seen before the financial crisis. 
According to Choudry “by the end of 2007, the growth in volumes of CLO issuance had 
become so significant that CLO vehicles were the largest non-bank lenders or purchasers 
of leveraged loans in the primary market. These leveraged loans were used in leveraged 
buyouts (LBOs), and formed an important source of financing to the private equity sector” 
(Choudhry 2010). 
                                                 
33 This chapter is based on a working paper, Hachenberg B. (2018): European CLOs: Impact of the risk 
retention rule. 
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CLOs, as most securitizations, had been hit severely by the recent financial crisis. 
Valuations and ratings of loans underlying the securitizations dropped massively and thus 
CLOs suffered and became difficult to manage. Default levels were low though, S&P for 
example reports defaults of less than 0.4% out of just under 10,000 U.S. CLOs rated 
between 1994 and 2017 (S&P Global Market Intelligence 2018). 
One of the many regulations introduced after the financial crisis is the so-called “risk 
retention rule”. Sponsors or originators of securitizations are required to retain at least 
5% of the securitization throughout the life of the transaction. Goal of the regulation is 
the alignment of interests between sponsor/originator and investor. 
Within this study, we analyze the implications the introduction of the risk retention rule 
had on securitizations, especially on managed CLOs. We construct a unique 
comprehensive dataset consisting of European cash CLOs and investigate if the regulation 
reached its goal. To this aim, we look at three fields. Firstly, we look at new issuances of 
CLOs since introduction of the risk retention rule. An alignment of interests could be 
followed by increased investor demand and thus increased issuance. Secondly, we analyze 
implications of the rule on CLO managers. Thirdly, we study the form in which the risk 
retention is retained and analyze if the form of risk retention influences issuance spreads. 
This study contributes to the existing literature about CDOs and the regulations 
introduced since the financial crisis. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. 
Section 2 provides an overview of the recent CLO literature and the risk retention rule. 
Section 3 describes the data and the applied methodologies. Section 4 then outlines 
descriptive statistics and our empirical results, and the last section concludes the paper. 
5.2 Function of a CLO, history of the risk retention rule and current 
state of literature 
5.2.1 Function of a CLO 
CLOs are securitizations backed by a pool of debt, usually loans to corporates. These loans 
are generally senior secured and leveraged (i.e. the borrower has a significant level of 
debt, e.g. through a leveraged buyout operation). 
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CLOs can be balance sheet34 or arbitrage deals (also called market value or open value 
transactions), the latter being much more common nowadays. If the CLO underwriter 
originated the loans and held them on his balance sheet, the CLO is mainly issued for 
regulatory or funding purposes. On the contrary, arbitrage deals, the focus of our study, 
have a CLO manager who typically acquires loans in the primary or secondary market and 
benefit from the spread between assets and liabilities of the transaction. Furthermore, a 
reinvestment period gives the CLO manager the flexibility to purchase loans to offset 
prepayments for a certain period throughout the life of the transaction and manage the 
portfolio according to guidelines defined at origination of the CLO. The asset manager is 
compensated through a fee (senior management fee) and often in addition a performance 
fee (subordinated management fee)35. Fitch Ratings lists in their CLO Asset Manager 
Handbook 74 global CLO managers, who are either subsidiaries of insurance companies, 
banks, private equity firms or asset managers (Fitch Ratings 2017) and specialized in the 
management of leveraged loans. 
A CLO is tranched, typically consisting of a few rated debt tranches and an unrated equity 
tranche. The equity tranche, also called first-loss-tranche, junior tranche or preferred 
shares, bears the highest risk of the transaction, but receives the excess return and has 
specific rights, e.g. the right to call the CLO (see e.g. Fabozzi and Mann 2012). In most 
cases the performance of a CLO is judged by the performance of the equity tranche, and 
the CLO manager often receives a performance fee linked to the excess cash flow the 
equity holders receive. Additional approaches to judge the performance of CLOs also exist, 
Moody’s for example makes an effort to “balance the interests of the equity with that of 
the debt investors” and publishes a report that includes a variety of performance factors 
and CLO manager rankings (Moody's 2009; Sallerson and Haicheng 2017; Sallerson 
2016). 
CLO structures have changed slightly since the financial crisis. Post-crisis CLOs, called 
CLOs 2.0 (compared to CLOs 1.0 before the crisis), have amongst others smaller AAA-
tranches, no structured finance bucket (i.e. are not allowed to buy other CLOs or other 
structured finance paper), have more allowances for discount purchases, and looser 
restricted trading conditions (see e.g. Preston et al. 2017; Deloitte 2017). During a credit 
                                                 
34 For further details on balance sheet and arbitrage CLOs see e.g. Choudhry (2010) and Lucas et al. (2007). 
35 Management fees and the “waterfall” of a CLO are explained in detail e.g. in Lucas et al. (2007). 
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downturn CLOs 2.0 should be more stable than CLOs 1.0 (see e.g. Pistre et al. 2017; 
Preston et al. 2017). 
Potential information asymmetries between investors and issuers of securitizations and 
the possibility of adverse selection of the collateral pool are commonly analyzed. 
Albertazzi et al. (2015) study whether banks use asymmetric information for their 
advantage when issuing mortgage securitizations. For their set of data they see a lower 
default probability for securitized mortgages than for non-securitized mortgages. The 
findings are consistent with an earlier study from Ambrose et al. (2005). Contrary to this, 
Berndt and Gupta (2009) reveal that borrowers whose bank loans are sold perform worse 
than their peers and they suggest, amongst others, that banks should retain parts of the 
loans. 
Guo and Wu (2014) study the risk retention regulation on ABS, disclosure on securitized 
assets and informational asymmetries between issuers and investors. They find that for a 
risk-averse bank and a risk-averse investor within a dynamic model of asymmetric 
information, a flat-rate risk retention requirement cannot be optimal for all asset classes. 
Sufi (2007) analyzes information asymmetries within syndicates of corporate loans and 
reveals that the lead bank retains a larger share in the loan when the borrower needs 
more intense monitoring. 
The main difference between the mentioned studies and our paper is that loans 
underlying the CLOs we analyze are only in rare cases securitized by the banks which 
originated the loans. Usually the loans are acquired by a CLO manager in the primary or 
secondary market. Thus we have no evidence for asymmetric information and adverse 
selection but instead need to assume that the CLO manager acts in the best interest of the 
investor when choosing the loans, as he is compensated through, amongst others, 
performance fees (also called subordinated fees). Other reasons for a CLO manager to act 
in the best interest of the investor would be his reputation, a potential to only increase 
his assets under management (and thus, again, additional fees independent from 
performance, called senior management fee) when his CLOs perform well, as well as the 
risk that the CLO structure may break CLO specific tests, which could lead as a worst 
consequence to a termination of the transaction or replacement of the CLO manager. 
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Benmelech et al. (2012) analyze the performance of, amongst others, arbitrage CLOs and 
come to the conclusion that the securitization of syndicated loans is fundamentally 
different from that of other asset classes. They argue that interests aligned through the 
lending syndicate of corporate loans help to avoid adverse selection in the collateral pool. 
They found evidence for this even for loans originated by the bank acting at the same 
time as the CLO underwriter. 
Liebscher and Mählmann (2017) study market inefficiencies of the syndicated loan 
market by analyzing the performance of CLOs. Their findings are that heterogeneity in 
manager performance is consistent, but top managers do not seem to raise their fees when 
receiving additional assets under management. 
Bozanic et al. (2018) provide evidence through using methods of computational 
linguistics that loans securitized in CLOs have more standardized financial covenants than 
loans which are not securitized. Their findings are even stronger for larger shares of CLO 
investors per loan and when CLO investors buy loans in the primary market. 
5.2.2 History of the risk retention rule and current state of 
literature 
Leaders of the G20 summit in Pittsburgh decided in September 2009 that “securitization 
sponsors or originators should retain a part of the risk of the underlying assets, thus 
encouraging them to act prudently” (Leaders' Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit 2009). 
So called “originate-to-distribute” products had been the focus of criticism and seen as a 
contributor to the recent financial crisis. By asking sponsors or originators to retain some 
“skin in the game” leaders of the G20 wanted to align incentives of investors and 
sponsors/originators and avoid conflicts of interest. At the same time the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) stressed not only the need for an 
efficient and smoothly functioning securitization market to support economic growth, but 
also recommended “the retention by originators and/or sponsors of a long-term economic 
exposure to the securitisations” (Technical Committee of the International Organization 
of Securities Commissions 2009). 
In Europe leaders acted through amendments of the Banking Consolidation Directive by 
Directive 2009/111/EC (Official Journal of the European Union 2009). Article 122a was 
added which requires that “A credit institution, other than when acting as an originator, 
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a sponsor or original lender, shall be exposed to the credit risk of a securitisation position 
in its trading book or non-trading book only if the originator, sponsor or original lender 
has explicitly disclosed to the credit institution that it will retain, on an ongoing basis, a 
material net economic interest which, in any event, shall not be less than 5 %” (Official 
Journal of the European Union 2009). 
In summer 2010 the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) elaborated 
guidelines for the convergence of supervisory practices with regards to Article 122a. They 
conducted a public hearing and gave the industry three months to respond to their 
proposals (CEBS 2010a). Although European guidelines were the subject of discussion, 
CEBS received global comments from banks, providers of financial services, legal firms 
and associations. A number of them stressed, amongst others, that the proposed risk 
retention rule would materially impact managed CLOs and thus the syndicated loan 
market, as CLO managers are generally thinly capitalized asset managers (see e.g. LSTA 
The Loan Syndications and Trading Association 2010; AFME BBA ISDA 2010; Loan 
Market Association 2010). Their fear was that loan liquidity would be severely affected 
and as a consequence the availability of growth capital to companies reduced. 
Furthermore, they outlined that the proposed risk retention rule was not aligned with the 
risk retention provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act. 
In their response at the end of 2010, CEBS agreed that for managed CLOs “there may be 
no entity that can adequately and efficiently fulfill the role of originator, sponsor or 
original lender”. Instead of grandfathering managed CLOs from the risk retention rule 
though, they discussed that under certain conditions the creation of an “originator special 
purpose vehicle” fulfilling the requirements may be allowed (CEBS 2010b). There was 
still a lot of uncertainty about the risk retention rule, especially for CLOs, but Article 122a 
of the Banking Consolidation Directive together with the related CEBS (now the European 
Banking Authority) guidelines and the Questions & Answers published by the European 
Banking Authority came into force at the beginning of 2011 for new securitizations. The 
rules were replaced with the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) at the beginning of 
2014. Figure 5.1 shows the main steps in the enforcement of the risk retention rules in 
Europe and the U.S. 
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Figure 5.1: Roadmap of the risk retention rule 
It took until 2013 for arbitrage CLO managers to find (if at all) a way to fulfill the risk 
retention rule and find (or borrow) the capital to retain risk (see e.g. Börsen-Zeitung 
2013). They either go the “originator route” (the entity that originally holds and then sells 
assets to the CLO issuer is allowed to retain the risk), or the “sponsor route” (a credit 
institution or investment firm that manages the CLO retains the risk). 
As CLO managers based in the United Kingdom may lose their status as investment firms 
licensed under the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) due to Brexit (see 
e.g. Clifford Chance 2016), more CLOs in 2017 have been issued going the “originator 
SPV” route than before Brexit was decided (McGarry et al. 2017). 
Present risk retention rules are Article 405ff. of the Capital Requirements Regulation, 
Article 51 of the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Regulation and Article 254 of the 
Solvency II Delegated Act. Institutions bound by those provisions can only invest in 
securitizations under the condition that the originator, sponsor or original lender has 
explicitly disclosed that he is retaining a material net economic interest of at least 5% of 
the securitization. Thus the current rules are investor based, i.e. the investor has to make 
sure that the securitization he buys follows the risk retention rules. The offering circular 
of a CLO provides details regarding the risk retention rules, but this can be up to a few 
pages, outlining that the investor should contact his own legal, accounting, regulatory 
Global: G20 
summit in 
Pittsburgh, ”skin 
in the game“ 
 
Europe: CRR 
replaces 
Article 122a 
 
U.S.: Risk retention 
repealed for U.S. 
open market CLOs 
 
Europe: Article 
122a of the 
Banking 
Consolidation 
Directive comes 
into force 
U.S.: In 
December Dodd-
Frank risk 
retention comes 
into force 
2009 2014 2017 
2011 2016 
 65 
and other advisors to determine whether the information provided is sufficient to fulfill 
the risk retention rules. The current, fragmented and “investor based approach” of the 
European rules is on the edge of being changed again and largely replaced with combined 
securitization regulation provisions (Official Journal of the European Union 2017b, 
2017a). 
In Europe, the CLO manager has various options to retain the risk. He can take a so-called 
“horizontal retention”, i.e. retain 5% in one tranche, the equity tranche. He can also retain 
a “vertical” slice in the securitization, which would be 5% of each tranche (see e.g. 
Geithner 2011). Due to the nature of the CLO, the interests of the equity tranche holder 
(who receives excess return and has the possibility to call the deal) and those of the debt 
tranche holder may diverge. Thus by having “skin in the game” in the form of an equity 
tranche, the CLO manager bears (part of) the risk of the first-loss-tranche, but at the same 
time increases his goals, i.e. in addition to a subordinated performance fee, he also 
benefits from excess cash flow of the transaction and might be tempted to buy riskier 
collateral than otherwise if not invested. 
Tavakoli (2008) names this problem very explicitly. She sees a clear conflict of interest 
between manager and debt investor, once the manager has a claim on the equity cash 
flows. She explains that there is a risk of moral hazard, as by the time losses are larger 
than the initial equity investment of the manager, the manager benefits if the spread 
income of the portfolio is as high as possible. Any further losses above the equity will be 
borne by the debtholders. Since further losses reduce the principal amount of the next 
most senior tranche, the coupon payment is then calculated off of a lower principal 
amount. This leads to the consequence that the deal liabilities are decreasing and the CLO 
manager earns more excess spread. This behavior could be limited by implementing 
trading restrictions and cash flow triggers in the structure of the transaction, but the risk 
retention rule does not mention any of this. On the contrary, today’s CLOs 2.0 even have 
looser restricted trading conditions than former CLOs 1.0 (see e.g. Preston et al. 2017; 
Deloitte 2017). 
Furthermore, the equity owner has the right to call the transaction and opportunity to 
refinance the deal in a tighter spread environment, something which has recently become 
very common. Liebscher and Mählmann (2017) find that superior equity tranche 
performance does not come at a cost for debt note holders. Their dataset however only 
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takes into account CLOs issued up to 2012. On the contrary, Morgan Stanley (2017) 
reports that recently structural leverage ratios of European CLOs increased significantly 
(e.g. by creating single-B tranches), which is positive for equity investors but not for debt 
investors, as they bear the tail risk of the transaction. 
Overall, we summarize that by retaining solely parts of the equity tranche, interests of the 
debt and the equity investor and as such interests of the sponsor/originator and the 
investor are not necessarily aligned. The situation can be different when the CLO manager 
retains a vertical slice, here we would not rule out that interests of the sponsor/originator 
and investors are aligned. 
In the U.S., the risk retention rules came into force in December 2016, but are currently 
in the process of being changed again. The U.S. Treasury recommends a “broad qualified 
exemption for CLO risk retention” (U.S. Department of the Treasury 2017). Arguments 
for an exemption are that CLO managers would act more like asset managers, as they buy 
loans in the open market instead of originating them and receive compensation through 
a performance fee. In addition CLO managers would have limited access to capital and 
the additional burden, especially for smaller managers, may create an unhealthy 
consolidation in an important sector of corporate borrowing. 
5.3 Sample construction and methodology 
As a base for our analysis we use data from the internal database of a large European 
bank. We analyze European CLOs since the financial crisis, thus we use securitizations 
from 2010 to 2017. In order to receive a homogenous sample, we exclude CLOs whose 
collateral are loans to small and medium-sized companies (SME CLOs) and synthetic 
CLOs36. We also exclude CLOs that are not rated by at least one of the rating agencies 
Moody’s, S&P and Fitch Ratings. 
CLO tranches that are issued in non-Euro currencies (pound sterling, U.S. dollar) we 
recalculate into Euro, using the exchange rate at date of issuance of the respective 
tranche. As date of issuance we use the pricing date of the CLO37. Descriptive statistics of 
the CLO sample are shown in Table 5.1. The sample includes 253 CLOs and the average 
                                                 
36 For a detailed description on synthetic CDOs see e.g. Choudhry (2010). 
37 Only in rare cases where no pricing date is available we use the settlement date as date of issuance. 
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number of tranches is relatively high at slightly more than 7 per CLO. Asset managers 
includes any firm that is not a bank, which can be an alternative asset manager, private 
equity firm, CLO manager etc. 
Table 5.1: European CLOs 2010-2017 
This table shows descriptive statistics of European CLOs (excluding SME and synthetic transactions) issued 
between 2010 and 2017. 
Descriptive statistics   
CLOs 253 
Tranches 1,898 
Mean # tranches 7.51 
Total Amount (Euro) 131,505,158,089 
Mean Amount CLO (Euro) 519,783,234 
CLO Managers 48 
Banks 7 
Asset Managers 41 
We manually complement missing data with the use of the weekly publication “Global 
ABS/CDO Weekly Market Snapshot” published by J.P. Morgan, the CLO Asset Manager 
Handbook published by Fitch Ratings, Creditflux and Leveraged Commentary and Data 
(LCD) published by S&P. 
Thereafter we split our sample of CLOs into balance sheet and arbitrage deals. The high 
average issuance amount per CLO (see Table 5.1) is driven by balance sheet transactions, 
arbitrage transactions are smaller on average. We take a specific look at the CLO 
managers of arbitrage deals. CLO managers that consolidated between 2010 and 2017 
we report by their current firm (as of March 2018). 
We analyze the structural leverage of the arbitrage CLO sample by calculating the relative 
size of the equity (first loss) tranches of the corresponding CLOs to find out if recent 
structures are more equity friendly than they used to be. As we believe an alignment of 
interests between debt investors and CLO manager cannot be guaranteed if the CLO 
manager holds the equity part of the transaction (horizontal retention), we want to find 
out if a vertical retention (which may align interests) has any significance for the 
investors, which may lead to increased investor demand and thus a reduction in yield. 
Therefore we analyze issuance spreads of our CLO sample. We refrain from using trading 
prices, as CLOs rarely trade and prices differ widely. 
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The debt tranches of our sample CLOs are floating rate notes which typically price above 
Euribor. The equity notes usually do not have set coupons as they receive the excess cash 
flow. For our analysis, we include all rated debt tranches with spreads available at primary 
issuance. This reduces our sample of 1,898 tranches (see Table 5.1) to 1,438 tranches. 
The sample is further reduced by 153 tranches for which no retention form is published, 
neither by Fitch nor LCD. We use OLS regressions, corrected for heteroscedasticity and 
the issuance spread (in bps above the benchmark) as the dependent variable. As 
independent variables we take a number of control variables. We first recalculate the 
original ratings at issuance of our CLO debt tranches using a numerical 17 grade scale 
(Aaa/AAA=1, Aa1/AA+=2,.., Caa1/CCC and below =17). The CLOs are rated by 
Moody’s, S&P and Fitch Ratings, most tranches are rated by two credit rating agencies. 
For our calculations, we use the lowest of the ratings available. Our first independent 
variable is the numeric rating of a tranche. As the next variable, we take the logarithmized 
amount of the original notional at issuance of the tranche, log amount. Since a number of 
ways exist to account for performance of CLO managers, we decide to use the experience 
of the manager.38 Therefore, we rank the CLO managers by issuance volume for the time 
span in question into four groups and create the variable manager ranking. To control for 
macroeconomic conditions during our time span we group the CLOs by date of issuance 
and create quarter dummies for each quarter as in previous literature (see e.g. Fabozzi 
and Vink 2012). As a last, most important step, we look at the form of risk retention 
(vertical/horizontal) and create a dummy for vertical. We want to test vertical risk 
retention vs. horizontal risk retention, since we believe the vertical form of risk retention 
is the more favorable for a debt investor, as interests appear to be more aligned that way. 
Our model is defined as         (5.1) 
𝐶𝐿𝑂 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽4𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡+𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the idiosyncratic error term. An overview of our variables is provided in Table 
5.2. 
 
                                                 
38 Commonly, a CLO manager’s performance is judged by performance of the equity piece, since the debt 
tranches receive a predefined coupon. The performance of the equity piece can only be looked at during the 
life of the transaction, respectively after all tranches are fully paid. 
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Table 5.2: Overview and definition of variables 
Variable Description 
CLO Spread 
 
Spread at date of issuance of the respective CLO tranche, noted in bps above its 
benchmark. 
Numeric rating Recalculated lowest credit rating using a numerical 17 grade scale (AAA/Aaa = 1, 
AA+/Aa1 = 2, … , CCC/Caa1 and below = 17). 
Manager ranking CLO managers are grouped by experience (issuance volume) into four groups. The 
first group is defined as issuance volume > 3 bn Euro, the second is defined as 
issuance volume ≤3 bn Euro and > 1.4 bn Euro, the third is defined as issuance 
volume ≤ 1.4bn Euro > 850 m Euro, the fourth group is defined as issuance volume 
≤850 m Euro.  
logAmount Logarithmized original amount at issuance in Euro, local currencies are 
recalculated using the exchange rate at date of issuance. 
Controls Dummy variables for each quarter, from quarter 1 to 28; each of these equals one 
if the securitization was completed during the corresponding quarter, 0 otherwise. 
Vertical Dummy variable, which takes value 1 if the form of risk retention is vertical, 0 
otherwise. 
5.4 Empirical results 
5.4.1 Descriptive results 
Figure 5.2 shows issuances of European CLOs from 2010 to 201739. It becomes evident 
that while there were ongoing discussions about details of the risk retention rule, in 2010, 
no arbitrage CLOs were issued at all. 
Figure 5.2: European CLO issuances 2010-2017 
This figure shows quarterly issuances of European CLOs from 2010 to 2017 (excluding synthetic and SME 
CLOs), in billion Euro. Non-Euro tranches are recalculated into Euro with their respective exchange rate at 
date of issuance of the CLO. 
 
                                                 
39 Refinancings and resets are included in our sample. 
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During the years 2010-2012 only a few CLOs were issued, hardly any public deals and 
the thin CLO market was dominated by balance sheet transactions. Private equity firms 
had difficulties acquiring financing for their European transactions, in contrast to the U.S., 
which was mainly seen as a consequence of a lack of CLO demand (see e.g. Börsen-
Zeitung 2011). At the same time the CLO market was driven by a consolidation wave of 
CLO managers. Fitch estimated in 2008 already that around 20% of the 62 European CLO 
managers would need to leave the business, as they need around 2-3 outstanding deals 
to cover their costs (Baird 2008). 
It took until 2013 before the European market reopened for arbitrage CLOs. Market 
participants becoming comfortable with the new regulation landscape was seen as a 
reason for the increased level of CLO issuance (see e.g. McLoughlin et al. 2015). Since 
then the market recovered with a record issuance in 2017. 
Figure 5.3 shows that 41 CLO managers issued arbitrage CLOs between 2010 and 2017. 
Thus the number of CLO managers decreased even further than predicted by Fitch, down 
more than 30% from the 62 CLO managers in the market in 2008. This can again be seen 
as a consequence of the risk retention rule, as smaller managers struggle to find a solution 
to retain parts of their securitization. Discussions about the risk retention rule were going 
on since 2009 and the rule came into force in 2011. 
Figure 5.3: European CLOs by manager, 2010-2017 
This figure shows issuances of European arbitrage CLOs sorted by manager between 2010 and 2017, in Euro. 
Non-Euro currencies are recalculated with their respective exchange rate at date of issuance of the CLO into 
Euro. 
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Despite the increased level in issuances over the last couple of years, the CLO market saw 
a sharp spread tightening, especially since the market reopened for arbitrage CLOs again. 
Figure 5.4 shows that throughout our sample period spreads of AAA-rated CLO tranches 
continuously tightened. Due to the tighter spread environment, refinancings of existing 
tranches and/or resets of transactions, initiated by the equity investor, became very 
common. 
Figure 5.4: European CLO spreads 2010-2017 
This figure shows spreads at new issuance of AAA-rated tranches of European CLOs (excluding SME and 
synthetic CLOs) from 2010 to 2017. Spreads are shown in bps above the respective benchmark of the CLO at 
date of issuance. 
 
Morgan Stanley (2017) states that “… the structural leverage ratios are increasing 
significantly, a positive for equity tranche investors.” We analyze our CLO data, to find 
out if Morgan Stanley’s stated increase can also be confirmed for our timeframe and data. 
Hence we look at the relative size of the equity tranche of each CLO in comparison to the 
total original issuance amount of the corresponding CLO. We come to the conclusion that 
indeed average structural leverage increased since 2010. Thus if the CLO manager retains 
the risk in form of an equity tranche (horizontal retention) he benefits from a more equity 
friendly structure. Recently the relative size of the equity tranche is comparatively stable 
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at around 10%. Figure 5.5 shows the average size of the equity tranche of our sample 
portfolio, with quarterly vintages of CLOs sorted by date of issuance. 
Figure 5.5: Equity tranches of European CLOs 2010-2017 
This figure shows the relative size of equity tranches of European arbitrage CLOs issued between 2010 and 
2017, per quarter. Tranches issued in non-Euro currencies are recalculated into Euro with the respective 
exchange rate at date of issuance of the CLO. 
 
Tavakoli (2008) reports for cash arbitrage CDOs a typical equity tranche of 8% to 20% of 
the transaction. Therefore, the current leverage ratio of European CLOs is on the high end 
and thus equity-friendly, but still within the boundaries. 
The goal of the risk retention rule is to align interests of originators/issuers and investors. 
To judge if this goal was reached in the case of arbitrage CLOs, we study where in the 
capital structure the CLO manager retains risk. 
Fitch Ratings shows for various CLOs the risk retention investment form and structure 
type (Fitch Ratings 2017). For our sample of 1,898 European CLO tranches, 340 tranches 
are from CLOs which follow the „horizontal retention structure“, 452 tranches are from 
CLOs which follow the “vertical retention structure” and for 1,106 tranches the form of 
risk retention is not reported by Fitch. Additional data we complete through LCD, which 
leaves us with a total of 956 tranches (50%) following the “vertical retention structure”, 
731 tranches (39%) the “horizontal retention structure” and for 211 tranches the form of 
risk retention is not reported. Only 14 of those 211 tranches were issued in 2010, thus 
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
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before the risk retention rule came into force. Table 5.3 shows the split of tranches 
following the horizontal or vertical retention. 
Table 5.3: Horizontal and vertical retention 
  
full 
sample 
debt tranches with 
spread 
total  1898 1438 
horizontal risk retention 731 565 
vertical risk retention 956 720 
form of risk retention n.a. 211 153 
Typically the prospectus of the CLO contains a paragraph which outlines that at least 5% 
of the securitization is retained throughout the life of the transaction, but not in which 
form. This leads to the consequence that the investor does not necessarily know if his and 
the interests of the sponsor/originator are aligned. The risk retention rule does not require 
the CLO manager to publish the form of risk retention. The investor might not know if 
the CLO manager retains the same tranche the CLO investor aims to buy, unless the CLO 
manager e.g. explicitly states this during the roadshow or in the marketing material of 
the deal. The investor report might contain this information (double checking a sample 
of our CLOs we found some investor reports containing the form of risk retention, others 
did not publish the data) but the first investor report is only published after a (primary) 
purchase of the investor. 
In the U.S., the risk retention rule was only implemented in 2016 thus less data is 
available. But the percentage of CLO managers retaining the equity piece is even higher 
than in Europe. Deutsche Bank reports that close to 60% of CLOs issued in 2017 follow 
the horizontal retention structure (Deutsche Bank 2017) and the CLO manager retains 
parts of the equity tranche, a path which some CLO managers followed even before the 
financial crisis and the introduction of the risk retention rule (see e.g. Benmelech et al. 
2012). 
Furthermore, we study who has “skin in the game”, i.e. who provides capital to retain 
parts of the securitization. Again, the CLO manager has several alternatives. He has the 
possibility to obtain bank financing (mainly available for top tier managers), he can secure 
third party equity investment or he can provide the capital through a majority-owned 
affiliate (see e.g. Labbé 2017; Coffey 2015). Only the last option qualifies for us as having 
“skin in the game”. As CLO managers usually do not report which route they take to 
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finance the retained part, it is hard for us to draw a final conclusion, but it seems likely 
that external financing is a valid option. 
5.4.2 Regression results 
The results of our regression model are shown in Table 5.4. Since we only look at tranches 
which have a spread available at issuance of the CLO, the debt tranches, our sample 
consists of 1,285 observations. Our control variables numeric rating of a tranche, log 
amount and manager ranking are, as expected, highly significant. This means that for a 
CLO investor the credit rating of a CLO tranche is of very high importance and thus 
reflected in the spread at issuance of the tranche. The higher the numeric credit rating, 
the more spread he expects. The same is true for the original issuance amount of the CLO 
tranche. The original issuance amount is of high importance for the investor and reflected 
in the spread at issuance of the CLO. The investor expects for larger issuance amounts a 
more liquid secondary market in the transaction. This corresponds to previous findings in 
literature, which outline the importance of credit ratings and liquidity in fixed income 
instruments (see e.g. Fabozzi and Mann 2010; Amato and Remolona 2003). Likewise the 
manager ranking, which in this case is the experience of the individual CLO manager, is 
of high importance for the CLO investor. The investor distinguishes between managers 
with more and managers with less experience in managing CLOs and this is reflected in 
the spread at issuance of the CLO, as well.  
Table 5.4: Regression results 
This table shows regression results of our model. A detailed description of the variables used is available in 
Table 5.2. This table shows the coefficients and t-statistics, corrected for heteroscedasticity, in parentheses.  
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Numeric Rating 39.36*** 
  (101.69) 
Manager Ranking 5.78*** 
  (3.56) 
Size of tranche (log amount) 11.79*** 
  (8.57) 
Form of Risk Retention (vertical) 0.92 
  (2.94) 
adjusted R2 0.94 
F-test 742 
Number of observations 1,285 
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The form of risk retention vertical (vertical or horizontal) however does not show any 
signs of significance. Thus it appears that for the investor the form of risk retention is of 
rather minor importance and not reflected in the spread at issuance of the CLO. 
5.4.3 Robustness of the results 
As a next step we want to test the robustness of our model. We use our previous model 
and cluster the population of tranches by individual CLOs. Our new results are very 
similar to the previous numbers. The control variable numeric rating of a tranche, the 
control variable log amount as well as manager ranking are highly significant again. This 
means that for the investor the credit rating of a CLO tranche, the original amount at 
issuance of the CLO tranche and thus the liquidity as well as the experience of the CLO 
manager are key indicators when investing in a CLO and therefore reflected in the primary 
spread. The form of risk retention vertical does again not show any significance. This leads 
to the conclusion that the form in which the sponsor/originator retains the risk in the 
CLO, vertical retention or horizontal retention, is of minor importance for the investor. 
The results of the regression model are shown in Table 5.5. 
Table 5.5: Clustered regression results 
This table shows regression results of our model clustered by CLO respectively quarter of issuance. A detailed 
description of the variables used is available in Table 5.2. The table shows the coefficients and t-statistics, 
corrected for heteroscedasticity, in parentheses. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
  Clustered by CLO:  Clustered by Quarter:  
Numeric Rating 39.36*** 39.36*** 
  (80.01) (30.05) 
Manager Ranking 5.78** 5.78** 
  (3.10) (3.06) 
Size of tranche (log amount) 11.79*** 11.79*** 
  (10.29) (7.36) 
Form of Risk Retention (vertical) 0.92 0.92 
  (0.38) (0.28) 
adjusted R2 0.94 0.94 
F-test - - 
Number of observations 1,285 1,285 
 
As a last step we use our previous model and cluster the population of CLO tranches by 
time of issuance. Therefore, we create calendar quarters of issuance and cluster CLOs 
issued in the same quarter. Our results, presented in Table 5.5, look very similar again. 
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The control variables numeric rating of a tranche, log amount as well as manager ranking 
are highly significant. At the same time, the form of risk retention, vertical, does not show 
any significance. 
5.5 Conclusion 
In this paper, we investigate European CLOs since the financial crisis. Specifically, we 
analyze the effects of the risk retention rule, which came into force in 2011, on managed 
cash CLOs (arbitrage deals). With the introduction of the risk retention rule the regulator 
aims to align interests between sponsor/originator and investor of a securitization. 
We find that during the time of the introduction of the European risk retention rule the 
European CLO market suffered severely. Contrary to the U.S., for about three years no 
arbitrage deals were issued. European CLO managers consolidated and the number of 
CLO managers in the market decreased from 62 in 2008 to 41 at the end of 2017. 
The European risk retention rule is “investor based”, i.e. the investor bears the risk that 
the CLO manager does not fulfill the requirements. Thus it creates an additional burden 
on the investor and does not necessarily support the revival of a healthy securitization 
market. 
We also analyze the form in which the originator/sponsor retains the risk. By retaining a 
horizontal part of the CLO transaction, we cannot fully confirm an alignment of interests 
between (debt) investor and CLO manager. We come to the conclusion that the risk 
retention rule did not reach its goal, as an alignment of interests between 
sponsor/originator and investor cannot be guaranteed. A path that may be considered, is 
to follow the U.S. and repeal the risk retention rule for European arbitrage CLOs, as well. 
Furthermore, by looking at the variables that influence the spread at issuance of a CLO 
we find high significance for the CLO manager experience, rating of a tranche and the 
original amount at issuance. The form of risk retention (vertical or horizontal) does not 
seem to play a role and thus it seems to be of minor importance for the investor. 
As an area for further research it would be interesting to find out if the leveraged loan 
market was hurt by a lack of European CLO demand, or if other, less stable investors, as 
e.g. hedge funds, did take their place instead.  
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6 Concluding remarks 
In this thesis the reaction of securities, most notably the pricing of securities, is analyzed. 
Two questions are of particular importance. Firstly, the pricing of securities in reaction to 
changes in investor attitudes. Secondly, the pricing of securities in response to actual and 
anticipated changes in regulation. Object of investigation are bonds, stocks and CDS, auto 
ABS and CLOs. All financial instruments are analyzed in the aftermath of the recent 
financial crisis. 
The findings are twofold. Investor attitudes have an (economically) positive effect on 
green bonds (analyzed in chapter two), as ESG criteria gain importance among investors 
and drive pricing tighter. On the other hand, investors are still relatively reluctant to 
invest in securitizations in Europe, which becomes obvious comparing the European and 
the U.S. auto ABS market. 
The examined changes in regulation have imminent effects on the pricing of the analyzed 
financial instruments. The anticipated dismantling of the Dodd-Frank Act, which market 
participants expected after Donald Trump’s election as president of the U.S., led to a 
significant reaction of bank stocks and CDS, in particular G-SIBs’ stocks and CDS. Stocks 
gained and CDS spreads tightened, thus resulting in a positive reaction for investors in G-
SIBs. On the other hand, during the time a regulation was introduced in Europe, the risk 
retention rule for securitizations, European CLOs suffered severely. The market came to 
a hold for arbitrage CLOs and it took market participants, CLO managers as well as 
investors, years to adopt to the regulatory changes. Looking at the results of the thesis in 
detail, the following can be concluded. 
In chapter two the pricing of green and conventional bonds is compared. A panel 
regression is used to look at secondary i-spreads of green bonds and interpolated, 
matching pairs of non-green bonds. 7,032 daily i-spreads of green bonds and 14,064 i-
spreads of non-green bonds are examined over a timeframe of 1st of October 2015 to 31st 
of March 2016. The results show that green bonds price economically tighter than non-
green bonds, but with no statistical significance. Only for rating classes single A statistical 
significance is evident. Examining maturity, currency and issuing volume further, no 
statistical significance is found. But industries, in this case government related issuers as 
well as financials, and the existence of an ESG rating, are significant variables which 
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influence pricing. Although issuing green bonds is more expensive than issuing 
conventional bonds, at least the external extra costs should be covered by the overall 
marginally tighter pricing of green bonds. So in this case investor attitudes (increased 
focus on ESG products) led to a change in the pricing of the securities. 
In chapter three the effects of Donald Trump’s election as president of the U.S. on stocks 
and CDS, and with it an anticipated dismantling of the Dodd-Frank Act, is analyzed. The 
event study of the analyzed 71 financial institutions across 25 countries shows that the 
reaction of G-SIBs vs. non-G-SIBs is different. G-SIBs’ stock prices rise and their CDS 
spreads tighten, thus a looser regulation is seen as positive for these banks. On the other 
hand stocks of non-G-SIBs’, which are less regulated, rise, but not as strongly as G-SIBs’ 
stocks. The CDS spreads of non-G-SIBs widens. Thus in contrast to G-SIBs, for non-G-SIBs 
the fear might be that riskier business activities might only be positive for equity holders, 
but not necessarily for debt holders. 
Chapter four compares European and U.S. auto ABS. The largest 100 European and U.S. 
auto ABS are looked at in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, from 2010 to the 1st 
half of 2017. The study shows that the auto ABS market still plays an important role in 
financing the real economy. The share of auto ABS of total ABS even increased compared 
to the time before the financial crisis. The results of the models suggest that the U.S. auto 
ABS market has stabilized since the financial crisis, on the other hand European auto ABS 
still seem to be to a large extent dependent on ECB funding. Thus attitudes of the 
European investors changed since the crisis, as the market is still not back in equilibrium. 
Chapter five’s starting point is similar. The focus is again on securitizations issued since 
the financial crisis, in this case European CLOs issued from 2010 to 2017. Contrary to 
European auto ABS though, no European arbitrage CLOs were issued for a number of 
years. As this happened during the same time as the introduction of the risk retention rule 
for securitizations, regulation may have played an important role. Thus in this case stricter 
regulation, among others, may have led to a market hold, as well as to consolidation of 
CLO managers. Looking at the results of the deployed models, for the investor the form 
of risk retention, vertical or horizontal, surprisingly does not seem to be of importance. 
An issuer/originator who keeps a horizontal risk retention may not have the same 
objectives as a debt investor. The question arises whether the regulation reached its goal, 
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as an alignment of interests between debt investor and originator/issuer cannot be 
guaranteed. 
Overall, it can be concluded that both, changes in investor attitudes, as well as changes 
in regulation, impact the pricing of financial products to a certain extent. Evidence is 
provided for a variety of financial instruments (bonds, stocks, CDS, ABS and CLOs). 
It will be interesting to see how further changes in regulation and investor attitudes affect 
pricings. The European Commission is e.g. working on a common language for 
sustainable finance and a label for green financial products.  
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Appendix 
Table A.1: Sample of green labelled bonds 
This table shows the sample of green labelled bonds. The issuer name, coupon, maturity and currency of 
the issues are given. Rating is always the highest rating available from one of the three rating agencies 
Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s and Fitch Ratings. 
# Issuer Name Coupon Maturity Currency Rating 
1 ABN AMRO Bank NV 0.75 09.06.2020 EUR A 
2 African Development Bank 1.375 17.12.2018 USD AAA 
3 Agence Française de Développement 1.375 17.09.2024 EUR AA 
4 Agricultural Bank of China Ltd 2.125 20.10.2018 USD A 
5 Apple Inc. 2.85 23.02.2023 USD AA 
6 Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd 3.25 03.06.2020 AUD AA 
7 Bank of America Corp 1.95 12.05.2018 USD A 
8 Berlin Hyp AG 0.125 05.05.2022 EUR AAA 
9 BPCE SA 1.125 14.12.2022 EUR A 
10 City of Gothenburg Sweden Floating 03.06.2020 SEK AAA 
11 City of Oslo Norway 2.35 04.09.2024 NOK AAA 
12 City of Paris France 1.75 25.05.2031 EUR AA 
13 Digital Realty Trust LP 3.95 01.07.2022 USD BBB 
14 Electricité de France SA 2.25 27.04.2021 EUR AA 
15 Electricité de France SA 3.625 13.10.2025 USD A 
16 Engie SA 1.375 19.05.2020 EUR A 
17 European Investment Bank 3 23.04.2019 SEK AAA 
18 European Investment Bank 1.375 15.11.2019 EUR AAA 
19 European Investment Bank Floating 24.07.2020 SEK AAA 
20 European Investment Bank 1.625 04.02.2025 CHF AAA 
21 European Investment Bank 2.25 07.03.2020 GBP AAA 
22 European Investment Bank 1.25 13.11.2026 EUR AAA 
23 European Investment Bank 2.5 15.10.2024 USD AAA 
24 European Investment Bank 0.5 15.11.2023 EUR AAA 
25 Export Development Canada 0.875 30.01.2017 USD AAA 
26 Export Development Canada 1.25 10.12.2018 USD AAA 
27 Export-Import Bank of India 2.75 01.04.2020 USD BBB 
28 Export-Import Bank of Korea 2.125 11.02.2021 USD AA 
29 Hera SpA 2.375 04.07.2024 EUR BBB 
30 Iberdrola International BV 2.5 24.10.2022 EUR BBB 
31 ING Bank NV 2 26.11.2018 USD A 
32 ING Bank NV 0.75 24.11.2020 EUR A 
33 IBRD 0.25 20.03.2017 EUR AAA 
34 IBRD 3.5 29.04.2019 AUD AAA 
35 IBRD 1.375 23.06.2019 SEK AAA 
36 IBRD 2.125 03.03.2025 USD AAA 
37 IBRD 1.25 27.11.2018 USD AAA 
38 KfW 0.375 22.07.2019 EUR AAA 
39 KfW 1.75 15.10.2019 USD AAA 
40 KfW 2.4 02.07.2020 AUD AAA 
41 KfW 1.625 05.06.2020 GBP AAA 
42 KfW 0.125 27.10.2020 EUR AAA 
43 KfW 1.875 30.11.2020 USD AAA 
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# Issuer Name Coupon Maturity Currency Rating 
44 Kommunalbanken AS 2.125 11.02.2025 USD AAA 
45 Kommuninvest I Sverige AB 1.5 23.04.2019 USD AAA 
46 Morgan Stanley 2.2 07.12.2018 USD A 
47 Nederlandse Waterschapsbank NV 0.625 03.07.2019 EUR AAA 
48 Nederlandse Waterschapsbank NV 1 03.09.2025 EUR AAA 
49 NRW Bank 0.75 28.11.2017 EUR AA 
50 NRW Bank 0.25 05.11.2018 EUR AA 
51 NRW Bank 0.875 10.11.2025 EUR AA 
52 Province of Ontario Canada 1.75 09.10.2018 CAD AA 
53 Province of Ontario Canada 1.95 27.01.2023 CAD AA 
54 Regency Centers LP 3.75 15.06.2024 USD BBB 
55 Societe Generale SA 0.75 25.11.2020 EUR A 
56 Stockholms Lans Landsting 1 28.05.2021 SEK AA 
57 Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corp 2.45 20.10.2020 USD A 
58 Svensk Exportkredit AB 1.875 23.06.2020 USD AA 
59 TenneT Holding BV 0.875 04.06.2021 EUR A 
60 TenneT Holding BV 1.75 04.06.2027 EUR A 
61 Transport for London 2.125 24.04.2025 GBP AA 
62 Unibail-Rodamco SE 2.5 26.02.2024 EUR A 
63 Unibail-Rodamco SE 1 14.03.2025 EUR A 
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Table A.2: Sample banks, G-SIBs and non-G-SIBs 
This table shows the sample banks, divided into G-SIBs (Panel A) and non-G-SIBs (Panel B). The bank name, 
country of origin, and standard industry classification (SIC) code are given. The list of G-SIBs is taken from 
http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/2015-update-of-list-of-global-systemically-important-banks-G-
SIBs.pdf. 
 
# Name Country SIC code 
Panel A: G-SIBs  
1 Banco Santander Spain 6029 
2 Bank of America United States 6029 
3 Barclays United Kingdom 6029 
4 BNP Paribas France 6029 
5 Citigroup United States 6029 
6 Credit Agricole France 6029 
7 Credit Suisse Group Switzerland 6029 
8 Deutsche Bank Germany 6029 
9 HSBC Holdings United Kingdom 6029 
10 Industrial and Commercial Bank of China China 6029 
11 JPMorgan Chase & Co United States 6211 
12 Morgan Stanley United States 6211 
13 Nordea Bank Sweden 6029 
14 Societe Generale France 6029 
15 Standard Chartered United Kingdom 6029 
16 Goldman Sachs Group United States 6211 
17 UBS Group Switzerland 6282 
18 Unicredit Italy 6029 
19 Wells Fargo & Co United States 6029 
20 Bank of China China 6029 
21 Royal Bank of Scotland Group United Kingdom 6029 
22 Mizuho Financial Group Japan 6029 
23 Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group Japan 6029 
Panel B: Non-G-SIBs  
24 Acom Japan 6141 
25 Allied Irish Banks Ireland 6029 
26 Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Australia 6029 
27 Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena Italy 6029 
28 Banco de Sabadell Spain 6029 
29 Banco Popular Espanol Spain 6029 
30 Bank of India India 6029 
31 Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria Spain 6029 
32 Banca Popolare di Milano Italy 6029 
33 Commonwealth Bank of Australia Australia 6029 
34 Commerzbank Germany 6029 
35 Danske Bank Denmark 6029 
36 Erste Group Bank Austria 6029 
37 Industrial Bank of Korea South Korea 6029 
38 Intesa Sanpaolo Italy 6029 
39 Bank VTB Russian Federation 6029 
40 KBC Groep Belgium 6035 
41 Lloyds Banking Group United Kingdom 6029 
42 Mediobanca Banca di Credito Finanziario Italy 6029 
43 National Australia Bank Australia 6029 
44 Natixis France 6029 
45 Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation Singapore 6029 
46 PHH United States 6162 
47 Sberbank Rossii Russian Federation 6029 
48 Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken Sweden 6029 
49 Svenska Handelsbanken Sweden 6029 
50 Bank of Ireland Ireland 6029 
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# Name Country SIC code 
51 Westpac Banking Corp Australia 6029 
52 Woori Bank South Korea 6029 
53 State Bank of India India 6029 
54 Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank PJSC United Arab Emirates 6029 
55 Akbank Turkey 6029 
56 Banco de Chile Chile 6029 
57 Banco do Brasil Brazil 6029 
58 Banco Popolare Italy 6029 
59 Credit Saison Japan 6153 
60 DBS Group Holdings Singapore 6029 
61 First Gulf Bank United Arab Emirates 6029 
62 HDFC India 6162 
63 ICICI Bank India 6029 
64 ING Groep Netherlands 6029 
65 KB Financial Group South Korea 6029 
66 Nomura Holdings Japan 6211 
67 Shinhan Financial Group South Korea 6029 
68 Bank of East Asia Hong Kong 6029 
69 Swedbank Sweden 6029 
70 Keycorp United States 6029 
71 Macquarie Group Australia 6211 
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